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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Problem Setting 
Since the early years of this century, credit has been an important component 
in farm policy development. However the speciflc policy issues have ranged widely 
from insufficient credit to too much. from weak credit institutions and insufficient 
competition to excessive competition leading to imprudent credit decisions by both 
farmers and lenders. 
The use of credit in agriculture has also varied widely. Figure 1.1 summanzes 
asset and debt levels in U.S. agriculture from 1920-1970. Key financial ratios are 
presented as well. Farm debt remained at 1920 levels through 1950. However , th is 
apparent stab ility is misleading. 
The stock of debt doubled every len years between 1950 and 1970. During 
t he 1970s, expectations of higher future incomes, a soaring farm land market , liberal 
lending practices and high inOation encouraged many farmers to use financial leverage 
to take advantage of the boom. Deb t financed much of the growth in capital formation 
during this period. Farm debt grew three fold between 1970 a nd 19 0. The debt to 
asset ratios (Debt/ Assets) escalated from 16. percent in 1970 to 22.2 percent by 
1984. 
Nominal interest ra.tcs increased along with the levels of debt significant ly, in-
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Figure 1.2: The changes of fa rm assets and credit in 19 Os 
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creasing debt costs for fa rms. In 19.50, each dollar of farm income supported less 
than a dollar 's worth of debt (Debt/NFI). This ratio slowly increased to about 4 in 
1980. Between 1970 and 1980, the debt to income ratio increased three times to a 
high of 11. As shown in figure 1.2, <luring the 1980's, falling debt and improving 
incomes returned this ratio to levels observed in the fifties. However growing farm in-
comes and rapid inflation masked the danger of increased leverage. The risks faced by 
farmers also increased as well. Rapid growth of agricultural exports coupled with the 
switch to floating exchange rates in the 1970s increased the sensitivity of agricultural 
commodity pr ices to domestic and foreign macro-economic policies. 
This inflation fed. and debt financed boom came to a crashing halt Ill 1979. 
The eighties ushered in a period of high real in terest rates, reduced exports, low farm 
income compared to the 1970s and declining farm la nd values. These condit ions led to 
the widespread adjustments in both the farm and financial sectors of the agricultural 
economy. By the end of l he 1980s farm debt had decreased almost by 20 percent. 
This reduction came painfully as t,he result of asset liquidation by farmers, loan losses 
by lenders on pay downs. 
At the beginning of t he 1990s, the agricultural sector in the U.S. had stabilized. 
Income levels were at histo rical highs. The DAR and Debt/NFT ratios had returned 
to pre 1970 levels. Despite t he apparent equilibrium, however a new set of concerns 
about farm credit began to emerge. 
The trauma and adj ustments of t he 1980s forced farmers to delay capital pur-
chases. Sales of new equipment plummeted sign ificant ly. IL has been found, for 
example that over 88 percent o r the t racto rs used by farm operators in Iowa, were 
built prior to 1980 (1989 Survey of Iowa Farm Operators). New investments in build-
5 
ings and in livestock facil ities were sharply curt.ailed as well. A report by the Iowa 
Business Council estimated that nearly most of Iowa's livestock facilities needed ma-
jor renovation or replacement. Credit would be needed to modernized machinery, 
equipment and livestock facili ties. T here were also concerns expressed about the 
event ual transfer of farm assets to the next generation. The average age of farm 
operator continued to creep upwards approaching retirement level. Credit would be 
needed to facilitate t his transfer of agricultural assets. 
As concerns for adequate credit began lo mount, farm and rural leaders began to 
criticize, lenders for their apparent unwillingness t.o extend credit to farmers (Yepsen, 
1989). Many political advoca.nts urged lenders to loosen up credit to farm operators 
to accomplish t heir acute needs of credit a nd thereby to revitalize the farm economy. 
Wi th improved condi t ions in agri cu ltural credit markets, lenders are in a pos ition to 
satisfy a significant portion of farm credit demand in 1990s. But, instead loan/deposit 
ratio in agri cultural banks remained low reflecting the evidence for t heir, a pparent 
unwillingness to lend locally as well as their appl ication of stringent standards on 
making new loans. Some analysts described the current credit problem not one of 
credit availability but of credit worthiness. Since lenders are carefully scrutinizing 
t he credit worthiness before making new loans. The loan to deposit ratio of the 
commercial banks a.re ri sing at a very slow pace. The average loan to deposit ratio of 
rural banks in Iowo. was .56.8 percent in 1989. ten percent below the lending observed 
in 1970's. ~ I any of Iowa's smaller ban ks w<'re far below the state average as were 
banks in economically depressed rural Iowa communities. In 1989, Iowa banks had 
loan/deposit ratios ranging from a low of two percent al small banks in Southern 
Iowa to 94 percent a t large metropolitan ba nks in Des ~foines (Yepsen. 1989). 
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In addi t ion to the t ight commercial credit. credit a na lysts have also expressed 
concern about recent policy changes that may restrict credi t for borrowers who are 
heavily dependent on t he federal government as t heir primary source of credi t. For 
several years, federal funding levels for Farmers Horne Administ rat ion direct loans 
have been declined . The mission of inst.itut ion has been redirected towards providing 
guarantees through commercial lenders. The 1990 farm bill accelerates th is transi t ion. 
Guarantees may ration credit to high risk borrowers more effectively t han d id direct 
lending of appropriated funds. 
In response to criticisms about overly conservat. ive lending practices, banking 
industries spokes-persons have indicated that low loan/deposit rat io, does not nec-
essarily mean banks are neglecting communi ty's needs. Many banks which have 
recently recovered from t he loan losses, incurred during the farm financial crisis, re-
mained cautious a bout agricul tural lending. They argue that prudent lending prac-
t ices requires them to reduce their exposure to the fl uctuat ions in farm profi tabili ty 
and asset values. T he pro-debtor laws int roduced during the 1980's, also impose an 
addi t iona l risk on lenders (F inancial Committee of the First State Bank, Webster 
City, Iowa). Resolulion of problem loans becomes more difficul t and costly during 
periods of financial adversity, with pro-debtor laws. 
Low lending rates may also be the result of weak demand for farm loans. Despite 
low interest rates in early 1990's debt in t he farm sector increased very slightly. 
Lenders claim this behavior as a reflection of farmers' reluctance to make new cap.ital 
investments in t he midst of the general recess ion. Uncertainties about the future may 
keep many farm operators away from seeking new loans. 
Whether a supply side or a dema nd side phenomenon, credit avai labili ty to 
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farmers and rural a reas is a n emerging policy issue. This fact was demonstrated by 
including in the 1990 farm bill a mandated study of rural credit cost and availability 
(United States General Accounting Office, 1992). The major objective of this was to 
evaluate the availabi li ty and adequacy of credit in rural America for the purpose of 
financing agricultural production, infrastructure and rural development and to clarify 
ihe level of lending and investments acti vities of lending institutions in rural America. 
Objectives 
T he primary object ive of this research is to sLudy the existence and sources of 
credit rationing in a sample farm population of [owa farm operators . This thesis will 
focus on the following hypotheses. 
1. Is credit viewed as a limiting resources by farm operators? Do farm operators 
believe profits from the farming operation are being restricted due to inadequate 
financing. 
2. If cred it appears to be limiting, is iL being restricted by farmers themselves or by 
their lenders? Farm operators may deli berately forego investment opportuni t ies 
because of their reluctance to use debt financing. They may be constrained due 
to res tri ctions imposed by lenders as w("ll. 
3. If cred it rat ioning appea rs to exist. determine the chara.cterist ics of farmers who 
are or a re not being rationed. Parm operators being rationed may have distinct 
personal and financial characterisLics, the operators not being rat ioned. 
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Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chap ter 2 provides a review of credit rationing 
concepts and t heory. Chapter 3 develops an empirical procedure to identify credit 
constrained farm operators. Chapter 4 presents and interprets the results from the 
empirical analysis . Chapter 5 presents some conclusions and suggestions for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
There is an extensive literature on credit and capital limits. The literature 
reviewed in th is chapter , will facilitate Lhe development of a conceptual model of 
external and internal cred it limits in farm production. The first part of the chapter 
reviews the role of credit and cred it allocation. The second part presents discussions of 
possible credit rationing methods, and reasons and implications of t hose on borrowers, 
lenders and on the whole society. T he chapte r concludes wi th a di scussion of the 
characteristics of internal and external credit raLioned farm borrowers. 
Role of Credit 
Cred it extended to farmers may be classified in many ways. The more common 
characterist ics include t he duration over which funds are used, t he pricing mechanism 
employed , the repayment pattern involved , t he purpose for which loan funds are used, 
t he lending source provid ing funds, nnd the type of colla teral necessary to secure the 
loan. This di scuss ion will focus on the role of credit using a classification based on 
loan duration. 
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Short term credit 
Short term loans have maturities for one year or less. These are also referred to 
as production or non-real estate loans. They are mostly used to finance the purchase 
of operating inputs and to hold inventories of stored commodities. In farming, inputs 
must be purchased in one period a nd products are sold later in the year, because 
cash inflows and out flows do not occur simultaneously. The use of short term credit , 
makes it easier to absorb these fluctuations and to match cash inflows and outflows 
(Lee et al. , 1988; Brake. 1983: Padmanabhan. 1989). 
Intermediate term credit 
Intermediate term loans have maturities ranging from 1 to 10 years. They are 
used to fi nance the purchase of many types of assets, such as breeding livestock, farm 
machinery and equi pment; and farm structures such as livestock prod uct ion or grain 
storage facilities. 
The use of intermediate term credit may make it possible to substitute one re-
source for another. for example mach inery might be substituted for labor as a means 
of reducing cost, improving timeliness, or increasing the efficiency of t he farm busi-
ness. New technological developments or changing market condit ions may require 
major adjustments in in termediate assets . For instance, adopting confinement hog 
production technology or acqu iring modern t illage, planting, harvest ing or power 
equipment may be essential to maintain efficiency and farm income as prices decline 
and costs increase. Such adjustments req uire majo r capital investments and inter-
mediate term credit can be used to ass ist in mak ing these adjustments and changes 
(Lee et al., 1988) . 
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Long term credit 
Long term credit in agriculture is mostly used to finance land purchases. Long 
term loans carry maturities in excess of 10 years and less than 40 years and usually 
range between 15 and 30 years (Barry et al., 1988). Long term loans are primarily 
used to finance expansion of the land been operated by existing farms . However long 
term credi t is also needed to acquire start up capital and in t ransferring business from 
one generation to another. Getting established and obtaining control of a sufficient 
set of resources is a major problem fo r beginning farmers. Most new farm businesses 
a re spun-off from existing operations. The transfer of an on going farm business 
from parent to child usually involves large quantities of capital. Without credit, 
many operations wou ld have to liquidate during the transfer process, because some 
nonfarm heirs may want their inheritance in cash rather than an ownership interest in 
farm real assets and other assets. Credit is essent ial for successful inter-generational 
t ransfer, because the tax liability and claims by off-farm hei rs erode the liquidity and 
equity capita l base of the business, credit can be used to subst.it ute fo r the equity 
lost in t ransfer process (Lee ct al., 1988). 
Optimum Use of Credit 
T he decision to use credit involves a llocation of credit between use in loans and 
use in reserve (Barry and Daker. 1971). The choice presumably depends on the value 
of credit in each use. Hence the borrower has to f'valuate the returns earned from the 
business by employ ing borrowed funds and the liquidity value of the credit reserve. 
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Cr edit r eserve 
A firm 's credit reserve is represented by its unused borrowing capacity. The 
credit reserve is a valuable resource of liquidity for many farm businesses. Unused 
credit , like balance sheet assets that are liquid, constitute a reserve of liquidity that 
can be called upon to counter the effects of unanticipated events (Baker, 1968). The 
credit reserve reduces costs associated with liquidating productive assets to meet cash 
demands and then reacquiring assets later, when adverse conditions have passed. 
Allocation of credit 
By studying the producers credit allocation problem numerous economists have 
attempted to explain a wide range of issues such as the demand for a credit reserve, 
liquidity, a nd reservation prices on cred it use. Ba ker and Hopkin (1969) explored the 
effects of leverage and liquidi ty on t he growth characteristics of the farm business. 
Specifically they examined the credit equilibrium of a farm based on the costs and 
returns of credit in its two possible uses. The model assumed that a farm operator 
established a business relationship wit.h one major lender and he engages in the 
production of a single farm commodity. 
The curve labelled V R in Figure 2.1, represents increments to loan costs from 
added units of debt. The curve's slope reflects t he assumption that the farmer faces 
higher cost of loan sources as hi s debt increases. It has two com ponents the interest 
rate (i) charged by the lender and the liquidity premium (r) ascribed by the borrower 
on the credi t reserve as a source of liquidi ty. 
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The interest rate is estab lished as a part of loan contract, thus it is observed 
in the loan market. The authors assumed the inte rest rate to be constant, over the 
amount borrowed, however increas ing interest rate schedule is plausible as well. 
The liquidity premium is a more subjecli ve concept, determined by the bor-
rower's level of risk avers ion. IL is similar to reservation price or required rate of 
return on the next unit of borrowing. The liquidity premium or credit reserva-
tion price is assumed to increase as add it ional borrowing depletes t he credit reserve. 
Conve rsely the value of additional uuiLs of unused credit is assumed Lo decline as 
borrowing decl ines (Barry and Baker. 1971). 
T he cu rve labelled \IL in Figure 2. L represents the returns from borrowing. Re-
turns from additional units of resources and resource services acqui red with borrowed 
funds are assumed to decrease a t an iucrcasing rate (Baker et al., 1988) . Hence the 
curve VL is considered to be a payoff schedule from using borrowed funds in the 
business or the oppor tunity cost of maintaining lhe credit reserve. Alternatively, this 
schedule could also be considered as the returns on potential investment opportuni-
ties, in descending order. ,·crsus lhc percent of credit in used in loans. The marginal 
returns on potential investment proj •els usi ng a criterion such as net present value for 
example , decl ine as discount rate increases. Therefore taking on a project financed 
with debt, whose. rates of returns exceeds its cost of capital, increases the owners 
wealth. On the other hand , if the rate of re turn of a project is less tha.n the cost of 
capital, then taking, on such a. project imposes a cost on current owners (Brigham cL 
a l., 1991) . 
Referring again to r:'i gure 2.1. \ 'l as the marginal rnlue of liquidity from credit 
held in reserve, a rational indi\'iclua.l may equate the marginal returns of borrowing 
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with marginal cost. In this case he would borrow OA with AB held as a credit 
reserve. This allocation of credit varies with risks associated with borrower as well 
as the lender. 
The height and shape of l!L and V R• are determined jointly by the manager's 
risk attitude, levels of ri sk, business characteristics, and practices employed in risk 
management (Barry et al., 1988). These curves also could shift and change shape 
over time, as a result of experience, age, preference changes or other changes that 
alter the importance of ri sk to him. 
Returns 
Debt financing facilitates the adoption of income increasing investments , as well 
as the maintenance and replacement of depreciab le capital items. Similarly, finan-
cial leverage enhances the returns on these profitable investments and capital stock, 
reducing associated business risks as long as leverage costs do not exceed the re-
turns. However t he fixed repayment obligations and reduced liquidity also increase 
the variabili ty of returns to the equity investor and raise Lhe potential loss of equity 
capital. 
Credit risks 
The amount of credit an individual is willing to use varies with the degree of 
risk aversion. The more ri sk averse the decision maker, the higher is the pos ition of 
VR and lower is the position of VL (Figure 2.2). Increasing risk aversion tends to 
increase the liquidity premium on unused credit reserves and Lo discount the returns 
of borrowing (Venezian, l9.59; Darry and Daker . 1971; Penson and Lins, 1980; Barry 
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et al., 1988). In the absence of lending restri clions the owners arbitrarily establish 
a cut off rate for investment that is higher than the firm's cost of capital. The use 
of this higher rate as t he discount factor in evaluating capital investments , at each 
and every discrete level of debt, would shrink the marginal returns schedule. Thus 
greater risk aversion yields, smaller debt holdings. This situation is referred to as the 
demand side or internal credit rationing and is illustrated by Figure 2.2. 
Risk aversion also influences lenders ' willingness to extend credit. Lenders may 
express their ri sk response to a farmer's credit worthiness in non price terms by 
imposing limits on credit availability. In that case, the curve \IL, the marginal value 
product curve may encou nter the right margi n of Figure 2.3, before it crosses V R 
leaving an excess return above the total cost of borrowing. Lender respond to risk 
by including a premium on interest rates. Jn this s ituation, the interest line (i) may 
curve upwards or become completely inelastic (Figure 2A ). 
Internal C redit Rationing 
As mentioned above, inte rn al or rationing by borrowers can result in reduced 
credit use (Figu re 2.2). Demand side or internal credit rationing by borrowers arises 
from their demand for credit reserves as a source of liquidity to counter unanticipated 
variation in their cash demands. f.'a.rm operato rs ma.y choose to rat ion their remaining 
credit capacity because t hey wish to save the rcmR ining for liquidity reasons (Penson 
and Lins, 1980). These self-imposed limitations on credit use provide liquidity in 
the form of a credit reserve and limit exposure of t he borrower's equity. Hence debt 
aversion is a form of r isk av<-'rsion and thereby const itutes an important alternative 
response to uncertainty (Barry and R<1kcr. 1971 ). 
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Reasons for internal credit rationing 
A number of studies over the past forty years have attempted to identify factors 
that result in internal credit rationing. 
Fear of poss ible reject ion One strongly suspects that for many farmers the 
fear of possible rejection keeps them from asking for loans, thus truncating the de-
mand for loans (Baker, L968). Jappelli (1990) indicated that individuals may not 
apply for credit, thinking they will be re fu sed mainly due to the ir lower income level, 
not sufficient collateral or clue to unestablished credit history. 
Attitude Heady and Swanson ( 19.52) provided evidence that 9.2% of southern 
Iowa farmers looked upon debt as being "bad''. Coutu and Lindsy (1961 ) investi-
gated the att itudes of the farm operators, in a ll income categories, toward accepting 
credit. They found that some low income farmers, were reluctant to accept credit. 
They viewed the te rms for avai lable credit specified by the credit institutions as un-
acceptably stringent. Further, the large volume of credit which wou ld be required to 
t ransform their farms into a viable commercial unit, coupled with the fear of losing all 
they currentl y possessed made low income farmers unwilling to use additional credi t. 
Coutu and Lindsy a lso observed that mid-income farmers failed to use credit 
m farm adjustments because unfavorable price behavior or improper management 
would, in t,heir view, <lcstroy their source of li vel ihood more rap idly than a gradual 
decline through failure to re-organize. High income farmers may also limit the use of 
credit because of fears that in destroying the stat 11 s quo. 
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Exp e rie n ce Bohlen and Beal (1961) showed that an experience deal ing with 
cred it that is perceived as a crisis with much emot io nal involvement may lead Lo an 
embedding of an attitude toward credit that will be difficult to change, and thus some 
farmers who have had si milar expe riences may restrict use of credit. For example 
farmers who li ved throug h the great depression may be conservative in their use of 
credi t. 
Ris k and u n cer tainties One of the key element in the theory of internal 
credit rationing is ri sk aversion. Heady and Swanson (1952) estimated. that 61..5% 
of southern Iowa farm operators identified greater uncertainity as the reason for 
t heir reduction in borrowing. ~ foreover they observed that some farm operators had 
faced , the diffi culty in making and carry ing-out decisions, when t.hey were confronted 
with risk and uncerta inty. Barry et a l. ( 19 1) a lso showed the inverse relationship 
between the credit ri sk and Lhe debt use. The greater the risk aversion the lower the 
amount o f c red it uses. Farm operators con fronted with uncertainties about lending 
institutions and about fut.ure economic policies Lend to reduce demand for credit and 
their indebtedness (Trechter cl al.. l!.) ' 6). 
External Cred it Rat ioning 
External cred it rationing is said to ex ist when a lender's supply of funds is less 
t han t he borrower's demand a t quoted rnnLrctcL terms. Two d iffere11t definitions were 
given for external credit rationi11g bftsed 011 relative role of loan rates versus non 
price facto rs of the loan conLrnCL. Lenders· risk re ponscs Lo differences in farmers ' 
cred it worthiness primarily may take Llie form of non price rationing using differing 
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loan limits among borrowers security requirements, loan maturities, loan supervision, 
documentation, and other means of credit administrat ion . In that case, lender may 
extend credit only amounts Lo OA instead of OA in Figure 2.3. A price response by 
a lender is characterized by a n increase in t he interest rate charged on the loan. 
N on- price rationing The concept of non price credit rationing as a bank 
reaction to changing economic conditions was developed in the early 1950s as an 
integral part of the credit availabili ty doctrine. Since thal t ime, the topic bas received 
considerable attention. Non price rationing is defined as a situation in which the 
interest rate persistenLly stays at a level where demand exceeds supply. Consequently 
insufficient supplies be allocated by some means other t han prices. 
Luckett (1970 ) examined non price rationing. He showed that banks use non 
price loan terms such as shortened maturities, larger compensating balances or col-
lateral, in t he decision making process to extend loans. In this case, markets clear 
via non price terms. Harris (1974) defi ned credit rationing as a change in non price 
contract terms by viewing the loan ag reement between a bank a nd its customer as 
a vector of contract terms Lbat includes the interest rate and all non price variables. 
He confirmed t he existence of non price rationing in the banks, by reviewing the time 
series data for long term ba.la.nces from 1944 to 1970. Azzi and Cox ( 1976) examined 
quantity rationing of credi t with non pri ce terms. They proved that a borrower can 
increase the size of a loan from a risk averse or risk neutral lender by offering more 
collateral. In other words, the supply of credit to a borrower is an increasing function 
of the amou nt of collateral and equity offered by Lhe borrower. T hey extended this 
proof to show t hat credit rationing can not. be optimal for any lender, as long as there 
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are no constraints on col lateral or on other equity components. 
Price rationing Lenders may also use the interest rate as a tool to ration 
loans to borrowers. Credit rationing through increase of interest rates, is regarded as 
price rationing (Figure 2.'1). 
Guttentag ( 1960) argued that the use of high interest rates would increase lenders 
own gross return per dollar, which makes it possible to attract additional loanable 
funds. In addition, the increase of interest rates will reduce the demand for loans. He 
also argued that, normally, t hNe is a tendency for interest rates and credit availability 
to move in opposite directions in response lo changes in demand or supply of loanable 
funds and these movements cou ld either persist temporari ly or indefinitely. 
Freimer and Gorden (1965) developed, a rationale for bankers to practice st rict 
price rationing, that is to set an interest rate and ration credit at that rate. They 
indicated that an expected profit maximizing banker would be willing to increase the 
size of his loan with the inlerest rate over a wide range of variation in the interest rate. 
However real bankers arc not so liberal and may not lend more than a finite amount 
regard less of the interest rate. The authors stressed that on high risk investments, the 
rates of interest bankers would charge would make it less attractive for individuals 
to borrow more than they could obtain at the customary rate and the individuals 
would be constrained at this instance. 
Stigl it z and Weiss ( l9 ' l) indica.ted that higher loan rat.es may increase the 
lenders expected revenues on any given project, but it may also create moral hazard 
and adverse selection eff ccts tliat could retard t.he lender 's expected revenues for all 
borrowers. 
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Historically, the heavier reliance has been placed on non price responses. In the 
late 1980s lhe balance appeared to shift more Lowa rd price responses in which interest 
rates are tailored more closely to the ri sk position and other financial characteristics 
of individual farm borrower. The wide spread use of loan pricing and customer 
profitabili ty analysis among commercia l bankers is a case inpoint . 
Reasons for external c redit r a tioning 
Short t e rm disequilibrium In the short term , excess credit demand is viewed 
as a temporary disequilibrium phenomenon. Somet imes referred to as dy namic ra-
t ioning. This may occur lhe economy experiences an unexpected exogenous shock. It 
has been suggested, in view oft.he ol igopolist ic structure of the banking industry, that 
the actual rate charged customers is li kely t.o adj ust slowly to changes in t he long run 
equili bri um rate. Consequently, there is a t.ransitional period in which rat ioning of 
credit occurs. By this defini t ion, dynamic rationing can be positive or negative, and 
it has be shown that its magni t ude is positively associated with the spread between 
loan rates (Jaffee, 1971). 
There are two main market. forces that can cha nge the actual loan rate. A change 
in market interest ra tes may lead to a change in t. he opportunity cost . Or a shift 
in the customer demand schedules influences t he rate. Any of t.hese met hods would 
dri ve up t he act ual loan rate. Therefore, it is quit.e apparent t.hat as the actual loan 
rate rises re lative to the long run loan rate, rat.ioning occurs (Jaffee, 1971). 
E quilibrium c redit ration ing Jaffee ( 1971 ) has st ressed the rationality of 
equil ib rium ration ing. Tie has shown that a bank classifies customers into equivalent 
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rate categor.ies. based on the risk characteristi cs of t he customer. Specific parameter 
values could lead to the profi tability of credi t rationing. In the two customer-one 
class case, Jaffee demonstrated tha t one customer would not be rationed while the 
other customer might be rationed. Similarly, when a bank servicing many diverse 
customers in te rms of demand and risk, is forced to classify these customers into 
a relatively small number of ra te categories, It would generally find it profitable to 
ration at least some of t hese customers. In the real world banks use a limited number 
of rate categories, t hus it is ine vitable to sec some borrowers being credit rationed. 
In the pas t, long te rm credi t rationing was explained by governmental con-
straints, such as usury laws and deposit rate ceilings. Usury law ceilings become 
restrictive if the ceilings arc not adjusted in line with ri sing market rates of interest. 
As a consequence, credit is rationed for some cust omcrs. Most usury laws in the U.S. 
were removed during the early l 980s. therefore it, is anticipated that credit rationing 
in these markets due to t hese imposed ceilings will decline in future. 
Asymmetric information Banks making loans are concerned not only about 
the interes t ra te t hey receive on t he loan, but also the ri skiness of the loan. However 
the interest rate a bank cha rges may itsel f a ffect the ri skiness of the pool of loans by 
either sorting po tent, ial bor row<" rs or affecti ng t he ac tions of borrowers. Both effects 
derive directly from the residual asymmetri c informa t.i on present in loan markets. 
Therefore banks become more concf'rned about. i11 creasing loan ra tes in the presence 
of asymmet.ri c information. 
In an asymmetri ca lly info rnw cl bank crcd il market, is one in which lenders know 
that borrowers with heterogeneous defaul t characterist ics ex ist. but are unable to 
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identify the "good borrower·• or control a specific borrower characteristics. Thus 
asymmetry in information and particularly I.he inability of lenders to di stinguish good 
borrowers may lead banks to rat.ion credit. to borrowers (J affee and Russel, 1976). 
Thakor et a l. , (1983) observed that, lenders can remove asymmet ry in information, 
but al a cost.. When banks ta ke in to account. these information costs , their cost of 
lending would increase. Therefore it. is likely I.hat banks will re fuse to supply credit 
simply because the cost of funds, exceeds the maximum possible price the credit 
appli cant can pay. 
In actual banking situations. some potential borrowers are denied loans even if 
they indicated a willingness Lo pay more than the market interest rale or lo put up 
more collate ral than is demanded of reci pients of loans (Stiglil z, 1981 ). Increasing 
interest r at.es or increasing collateral requireme nts could increase I.he riskiness of the 
bank 's loan portfolio, e ithe r by d iscouraging safer investors, or by inducing borrowers 
to invest in riskie r projects and t.herefore decrease t he bank's profit.s . Hence neither 
instrument will necessaril y be used to equate the supply of loanable funds. nder 
these circumstances, credit, rationing Lakes t he form of limiting the number of loans 
the banks will make. Clemcntz ( 19 7) gave a good interpretation for external cred it 
rat. ioning based on a.symmetric informaLion. Ife showed lhal, for a bank it is crucial 
importance to whom it grants a loan and what actions t he borrower Lakes. f'or a 
baker , in contrast, il is immateri a l Lo whom he se lls bread and what the buyers do 
with il. T he objec ti ve of a bank is not j us t lo find borrowers, but to find good 
borrowers. A good borrower from the bank 's point. of view is one who defau lts with 
very small probabil ity, who causes ::;mall adm inist rative costs, and who uses other 
services offered by the bank. 
Impacts of Cred it Rationing 
Barry (1988) suggested that Credit be viewed as a power concept. In the process 
of borrowing money, a farmer obtai ns the economic power to carry-out a particular 
course of action, however limited it may be (Barry, 1988). Thus the extension of 
credi t is a joint decision. The borrower and lender decide together, impliciLly of 
explicitly, upon the nature and the scope of the action which credit makes possible. 
Therefore rationing of credit affects borrow rs as well as lenders, perhaps the whole 
society. A substantial amount of recent work focuses on the importance of credit 
constraints and their effects on several sectors of the economy. 
Effects on borrower 
Investm ent Jaffee ( 1971) indica.ted that if firms are rationed in t he commercial 
loan market they are also rationed in the capital markets. Therefore commercial loan 
rationing will have a direct and important effect on investment expenditures of the 
rationed firms. However financial constrain ts could account for a large proportion of 
the aggregate va riability of in vestment. Fazzari ct al.. (19 ) found empi rical evidence 
about the effects of credit rationing on investment. They clearly emphasized the 
link between financing constraints and investment varies by type of firm. T hus the 
investme nt of fi rms that exhaust nea rl y a ll of thei r low-cost funds are more affected 
by fluctuat ions in t heir cash fl ows than the other firms. 
Cons umption Effects or credit rationing have also been ident ified in other 
sectors of the economy. Liquidity const raints play an important role in determining 
the path of consumption OV<'r t ime . When income is uncertain and individuals are 
unable to borrow, they will t,ake precautions against being caught short of income 
in the future. Hubbard and Judd (19 6) give a good deal of attention to intergener-
ational issues. They st ressed that the households systematically consume less earl y 
in life and more late in life than they wish, since liquidity constraints preclude their 
borrowing to smooth consum ption in the way that they would like. 
Performance Credi t constraints on farmers can significantly affect their fi-
nancial capacity and perform ance. Usually local lenders retrench and t,ighten up 
on credit extens.ion during periods of a.gri cultu ra l income st ringency . Perry (19 5) 
showed a t ighten cred it poli cy may increase the chance of prematurely terminating a 
farm operation t hat cou ld probably recover if given additional credit. This issue was 
demonstrated during the farm cri sis in 19 Os. 
Profit Patrick and Eisengrubcr (1969) found that credit rationing either in-
ternally due to individua l preferences or ex ternally due to lack sufficient resources, 
affected the rate of farm expansion. t\foreover. t he credit constraints also affected 
t he farmers profit margins. ln the 19 O's without accompanying increases in returns 
to farm assets, c redi t const ra in ts and higher loan rates reduced the borrower·s near 
term profitability from narrowing profit marg ins (Barry and Bernard , 19 5). 
Effects on lenders 
Credit ration ing also affec ts the lenders' pos ition in several ways . ll is known 
t hat the finan cial conditions of t he lend<>rs a re closely tied to the financial conditions 
of the borrowers. 
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Loan losses The fin ancial problems of t he borrowers could be easily trans-
mitted to t he lenders unless precautionary steps were taken. T hus it is quite rea-
sonable to ration borrowers to reduce lending ri sks , loan del inquencies and greater 
loan losses. Evidences indicated that the banks have made credit less available to 
finance corporate mergers and to restructure, i.e. to the high ly leveraged borrowers 
as a precautionary step to avoid possible loan delinquencies (LavVare, 1990). 
Earning power and capital In 1980s fin ancial institu t ions serving agricul-
tural areas experien ced the impact of severe fi nancial st ress among farmers for the 
second t ime in t hi s cent ury (Barry and Bernard ). f\'Jelicher and Irwin (1985) pointed 
out that , a t some fin ancial institutions serving borrowers and agri cul t ural businesses, 
a large proportion of fa rm debt was owed by customers who required part ial or total 
liquidation. This occurred at a t ime when asset prices were sharply reduced. The 
resulting loan delinque ncies a nd losses far exceeded risk premiums incorporated in 
interest rates, t hereby eroding loss reserves, threatening capital positions and de-
stroying earning power. 
Effects on society 
Credi t rationing reflects imperfect ions in capital markets and institu t ions . Ex-
cessive rationing limi ts credit and capital fo rmation may reduce economic efficiency. 
In cont rast, Greenspan( 1990) indicated t hat , it is the responsibil ity of the banks to 
foster prudent lending pol icies and adequate ca.pita] bases to protect the tax payer, 
whose credi t ultimately banks insured deposits. Ile stated t hat onl y in t hi s context 
of the continued vitali ty of the banking industry be assumed. 
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Credit rationing cannot be viewed as a totally negative action taken by lenders 
or borrowers. On t he contrary, credit rationing is necessary in some instances to 
protect other individuals and to foster the advancement of the economy. 
Characteristics of Credit Rationed Borrowers 
Credit constrained borrower 
As an operational definition, credit constra ined borrowers are defined as those 
who had their request fo r credit rejected by fi nancial instit ut ions. At first glance, 
one may suspect the validity of this definition as a proxy to identify constrained 
individuals. If there is a cost to ap ply, consumers with high probabili ty of loan de-
nials may not a pply because they perceive that , if they do, they will be rationed 
(J appelli , 1990). This group is referred to as di scouraged borrowers. Jappelli (1990) 
defined that credit constrained consumers must include both t hose are directly re-
jected and those, who are d iscouraged. Several researches have attempted to identify 
the characteri sti cs of credit constrained borrowers. 
Age The capi tal needs of young farm fa milies are subst antial both for house-
hold and farm operation pu rposes. T herefore these farm operators indicate a greater 
wi llingness to assume debt. T his is att ribu ted in part to the needs for accumulation 
in the early pa rt of the fa mily cycle (\1Vhi ttaker and Ahearn , 1991). Even though 
younger farmers appear to posses a greater willingness to assume debt, it is more 
likely tha t younger formers to be rejected by t he finan cial instit ution. 
Jappelli (1990) finds t hat t he single most important reason fo r a borrower to 
be rationed is t he fact I hat a credit history that had not been est ablished. This 
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is often a function of the age of applicant. Certainly age is an important factor 
closely associated with both vocational and social experience. Jappelli (1990) also 
determined that directly rationed and discouraged borrowers are young . 
Education The degree of formal education may influence the extent to which 
creclit is used . Therefore it is expected that t he credit use increases with educa-
tion. Formal education is expected, to improve an individual's knowledge and self 
confidence (Coutu, 1961). A previous study has indicated the positive correlation 
between the attitude towa rd agriculture and ed ucation . T hus a farmer who has a 
better education might be expected to bel ieve that the use of scientific information 
and methods in farming is necessary. This type of farmer would be rational in his 
decision making process and one might infer , more likely to consider the optimum use 
of credit as a means to success (Bohlen, 1961; Repp , 1962). Therefore a farmer with 
better education has a greater inclination to assume credit . Bagi ( 1982) observed 
that the probabili ty of a farmer would choose to use credit is positively related to the 
level of formal education. J appelli (1990) observed that t he rejected applicants as 
well as unconstrained consumers are more ed ucated than t he discouraged consumers. 
Assets Assets measure the productive capacity of a fa.rm borrower. There 
exists a posit ive relationship between t he high va lue on land , and t he willingness 
to take ri sks (Coutu. 196 1) . rt has also brcn observed t hat, the probability t hat a 
consumer is liquidity cons trained decreases with increasi ng asses. (Jappelli, 1990). 
Jappelli also finds that assets of rejected applicants a re 63 percent lower than those 
of the unconstrained consumers, further . t he di scouraged borrowers hold even lower 
levels of assets. 
Income It was observed lhai. tow income and medium income fa rmers show 
aversion to change. This can t ransla te in lo re luctance to assume credit. Conse-
quently they lend to postpone or avoid decisions essential to change and cling to 
thei r present system (Coutu, 1!)61). 
Lenders a lso conside r the level of income of borrowers as one of t he major de-
terminants in the c redi t evalua tion process. Tullio J appelli (1990) fou nd t hat the 
probability that a cons umer is cred it cons tra ined decreases with increasing income. 
The author a lso indicated llie income of the r<'jccl.cd applicants is 36 percent lower 
than that o[ t he unconstra ined consumers and discouraged consumers have e ven lower 
le vels of income. However credi t cons trained indi vid uals possess d iffe rent character-
istics than unconst rained ind ividuals. Accord ing lo t he research findings directly 
rationed applicants and d iscouraged borrowers have similar characteris tics . 
Conclusions 
This cha pter gives a crit ical accou nt of several ques t ions re la ted to t he existence, 
type and causes of cred it ra t ioning. Several infcr<'n ces can be d rawn from t his theory 
for the development of a model for credi t rationing in t he Iowa fa rm sector. 
firs t, the theory suggests that credi t rat ion ing, or the li m ited use of credit. could 
occur e ither by ex te rna l or inLerna l constra in ts. 
Second , Lhe t heory establishes lhe underly ing causes for credi t rationing. Exter-
nal credit rat ioning m<1y occur as a result of short run or long run disequilibrium or 
asymmetri c info rmation in cred it ma rkets. ln t.e rnal cred it rationing may a rise from 
t he bo rrowe rs attit udes toward risk or from factors Lhat inOucncc ret urns to capital 
investment. 
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A tentative empirical model proposed here, attempts and identify the forms 
of credit rationing in the farm sector, to investigate the characteristics of the farm 
operators belonging to separate categories and determine the releva nce of those char-
acteristics to credit rationing. 
The credit rationing model suggested is 
Y = J(D, F, C). 
where, Y = a credit rationing indicalor. 
D= Demographic characteri stics of the farm operator. 
F= Financial characteristics. 
C= Reasons for limi ted borrowing. 
(2.2) 
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CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This chapter will di scuss t he empirical procedures used in testing the hypotheses 
identified in chapter 1. The chapter begins with a di scussion of the sample data from 
the 1991 Iowa Fa rm Finance Survey and a description of the su rvey instrument. The 
next section presents a discussion of the procedures used in identifying and defining 
credit constrained and unconstrained farmers from the data. Next a description of 
the variables used in the study is presented. Finally a presentation of the empirical 
model to be es timated and a brief description of the estimation procedures used in 
the study is given. 
The Data Set 
The <la t.a used in this study were derived from the 1991 Iowa Farm Finance 
Survey (FFS). Demographic and financial information on 881 valid responses from a 
panel of 2142 farm operators was extracted from Lhe survey. A copy of the survey 
instrument is included in Appendix A. 
When demogra phic characteri st ics of the 1991 survey respondents are compared 
with the same characteris ti cs from Lhe 19 7 Census of Agricu lture, it is evident that 
the data over-re presents old r more est.abli shed farmers with large operations (Table 
3.1). Small farms (under l 0 acres) are under-represented in the 1991 data while 
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Table 3.1: Com parison of farm size and age distri butions between t he 
1987 census and 1991 Farm Finance Survey responsesa 
Farm F ina nce 
Survey 1991 
(percent) 
Farm size 
(acres) 
1-49 4.2 
50-179 16.0 
180-499 44.0 
500-999 28.4 
1000 up 5.6 
A vera.ge acres ·138 acres 
Age group 
Less than 35 2.0 
35-44 13.4 
45-54 19.4 
55-64 :35.8 
65 up 28.7 
Average age .SS years 
a Jolly and 13iedenbach. 1991. 
Ag census 1987 
(percent ) 
18.0 
26.2 
37.1 
15.1 
3.5 
301 acres 
19.3 
20.2 
20.7 
24.0 
15.8 
49 years 
med ium to large size fa rms (180 to 1000 acres) are over-represented. 
Farm operators under the age of forty-five are under-represented while farm 
operators over fifty five years are over-represented (Jolly and Biedenbach 1991). 
T herefore the 1991 farm fina nce survey is more representative of t he commercial 
farm sector in Iowa. 
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Identifying C redit Rationed Farmers 
This study uses cross-sectional <lat.a to assess the proportion of credit rationed 
farmers and their characteristics. Using establi shed definitions1 externally rationed 
farmers are those, who had their reques t for credit rejected by financial institutions. 
In the survey, only requests fo r intermediate and long term credit were considered. 
Requests for credit to expand or moderni ze t he fa rm business are believed to be more 
vulnerable to rationing than a re reques ts for short term operating credit. Operating 
credit will generally be extended unt il the farm business is on the verge of failure. 
As Table 3.2 depicts. I Gl out of "'74 fa rmers. in t.he sample requested financing 
for expansion purposes over the three year period beginning in 1989, on ly nine farmers 
were rationed out externall y. Consequent ly, us ing of those, denied as an indicator 
of external ration ing, data indicates that it is not a limiting factor in the Iowa farm 
sector. 
This observation is consistent with t.he recent lite rature available on rural lending 
(Drabenstott and USDA). The question ol' adequacy of credit , remains unanswered, 
however. It m ight be tha,t. farmers limit their use of credit volunta rily. This pattern of 
behavior may be consistent \\'i t h Bohlen a nd Beal's evidence a bout farmers) attitudes 
toward the use of credit.. Their work suggests Llrnt borrowers tend to discount the 
payoffs of investments us ing credi t., because of uncertai nty1 which in turn , may result 
in limited borrowing. The condition. which limits or complct,ely prevents fa rmers 
from using cred it. is known as internal rationing. In ternal credit rationing may be the 
major factor that acco un ts fo r Lhc limi t.eel use of credit in t he fa.rm sector. 
Although t he t heoret ica l model is helpful in conceptualizing t he factors involved 
in credit rationing, it is clifficu l~ lo app ly empiri ca lly. Consequently, an operational 
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Table 3.2: Percentage of credit requests and approvalsa 
Credit Rcq uesLcd Total 
yes no percentage 
Credit 
requests yes 17.4 0 17.4 
approved (152) 0 (152) 
no 1.0 ' l.6 2.6 
(9) (713) (722) 
Total l .4 .., 1.6 100 
(161) (713) ( 74) 
aThe number of obscrvalions are reporLed within the parenthesis. 
definition is used to identify credit rationed farmers. 
Internally rationed formers a rc defined as those, who did not request , but were 
s t ill aware of the need for c redit Lo operate t hei r farms more efficiently. Accordingly 
two classifications were developed Lo approximate forms of credit rationing occur 
among farm operators. Table 3.3 illuslrales different credit const rained/unconstrained 
categories based on classification one .. \ Lota.I of 63 farmers out of 713 who did not 
request financing fo r expansionary purposes answ<'red .. Yes" lo the question .. [fas 
inadequate financing limited the profitability or growth of your farm business ?". 
These operators may haxe recogni zed. limited use of credit as the plausible reason for 
limited profits or the growth of the farm opera.li on, but still may not use because of 
thei r avers ion to ri sk. Thes<' farm 01wrators «r<' assumed as the internally credit ra-
tioned. The category which includes incJ i,·iduals who requested for financ ing but still 
finds limited profits due to i1rndcq11<1te financing arc defined as externally rationed 
borrowers. i.e. 2.96 percent of lhc sample arc <'Xternally rationed (Group 1). As 
Figure 2.3 depicted external credit rationed farm operators may also have truncated 
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Table 3.3: Classification ! -requested for financing versus limited 
profit ability due Lo inadequate financing a 
Credit requested Total 
yes no percentage 
[l] [2] 
Limited yesb 2.96 7.1 10.15 
growth (26) (63) ( 9) 
[3] [4] 
no 15. 74 74.12 9.85 
( 13 ) (650) (788) 
Total I , -. I ' L.3 100 
( 16-1) (71:3) ( 77 ) 
aThe group number is given in square brackets. 
bThe number of observations are reported within the parenthes is. 
their demand schedule for cred it due to uncert.ainLies, but al this instant they are 
assumed to be constrained by external lender restrictio ns. 
According to classification l, of the 87i farm operators, total of 9 farm ers are 
credit const rained and rrst of the farmers ( i.e . !.>0% of the sample) are unconstrained. 
Among these unconstrained fa rmers only 1:3' (Croup :J), did reques t fo r financing 
while other 650 farmers (Croup ·I) did not. Croup 4 is characteri zed by older more 
es tab li shed farm operators (Table :3. 1 ). as Laduc ct al., ( 1991) ind icated. t hese farm 
operators have reached a rctlsonable income <lnd farm size, and thus they tend to 
reduce invesLment and use of deb t. 
C lassificat ion 1,,,.0 summari z<'s the information of Lhe farmers, those who re-
q uested finan cing versus willingness to accept. additional debt if lender offers to make 
credit available {Table :J. l). Tl1c willingness to assume debt may reflect. disposition 
toward taking on debt. Th<'refore it. might be expected that . if other th ings being 
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Table 3.4: Class ification 2-requested for financing versus willing to 
accept additional debt a 
Credit requested Total 
yes no percentage 
[1] [2] 
Willing to yesb 5.6 10.5 16.1 
accept (49) (92) ( 141) 
[3] [4] 
additional no 13.1 70.8 83.9 
debt ( 115) (621) (736) 
Total 18.7 81.3 100 
( 164) (713) (877) 
aThe group number is given in square brackets. 
bThe number o f observations are reported within the parenthesis. 
equal, farm operators with a higher willingness Lo assume debt wou ld use credit more 
often and in greater amount than fa.rm operators with a lower willingness to assume 
debt. 
As shown in Table 3..t , a. total of 92 out or 713 farmers who did not request for 
financing indicated Lhcir willingness Lo accept cred it. if lender offers. It may be t.hat 
their willingness to assume debt is overwhelmed by the uncertainties attached Lo use 
of debt. These operators may have recognized credit as a valuable source that can 
help them to obtain greater income, hut sti ll may not use it because of their aversion 
to risk. Thus those farm operators who d id not request, but st ill indicated their 
willingness to assume debt. <He defined as internally credit ra.Lioned farm operators. 
The category which includes individuals. those who already sought for financing 
but st ill willing to accept additional credit , arc defined as externally rationed farm 
operators. Accordingly .5.6% or Lhe sample arc externally rationed, based on the 
-10 
information of classification 2. According to classification 2, total of 13.1 percent of 
the sample consists of farm operators , requested financing but not willing to accept 
additional debt , a nd 70.8 percent of the sample, neither requested nor indicated their 
willingness to accept addit ional debt. 
Although the operat ional definit ions are useful in identifying farm operators to 
d ifferent credit const rained/ unconstrained groups, it is difficult to filter-out exter-
nally credit rationed farm operalors from the internall y credit rationed farmers more 
cleanly. The study will be proceeded . by presum.ing that the farm operators found 
in Group l. are most.ly represented by external credit rationed borrowers, and the 
those who are in Group 2. a re mostly internally cred it rationed. 
Comparison of Farm Operators 
It may be insightfu l lo compare t he demographic and financial characteristics 
of the various credit constrained groups. The following section presents income and 
balance sheet information for the sample population. 
Demographic characteristics 
Average farm operator characteristics usiug t.he two credit ration ing classifica-
tions are d isplayed in Ta.bles :L5 and 3.9. Stat ist ical significance of some interested 
va ri ab les are indicated. Tables ;3,.5 and 3.9 indica.le that the two classifications pro-
duced s imila r resul ts fo r the credit constrained a nd unconst rai ned farm operator 
groups. The major differences in farm operator characteristics based on lhe classifi-
cations one and L\\'o include: 
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l. According to both classifications, Groups one and three consist of younger farm-
ers with less farming experi ence and larger fami lies com pared to Groups two and 
four . Thus externally rat ioned farm operators (Group one) are younger than 
farmers of groups two and fou r. Jappelli (1990) fo und that young borrowers 
are more li kely to be rationed by financial inst itu t ions. 
2. The internally rationed farm operators (Group two) of the sample do not rep-
resent by young farmers as found by Jappelli . T his might be due to sam-
pling problems that, data under-represents farmers under 4.5 years and over-
represents farmers older than 55. Average age of Group two farm operators 
is significanLl y d ifferent than Lhat of Groups three and four farm operators, at 
t he 5 percent confidence level, implyi ng internally credit rationed farm opera-
tors are significantly older than Group three farm operators a nd younger than 
Group four farm operators. 
3. 1t is interest ing to note t hat Group fou r farm operators a re the oldest on average, 
with more years experience in farmi ng, smaller fam ilies and less education than 
othe r three group averages. i'lfean age of Group four farm operators is higher 
t han the rest of the groups at five percent confidence level. 
4. Group two farm operators are more educated than farm operators of Group 
fo ur . This contrad icts f'adie r find ings about the low level of the internally 
cred it rationed borrowers. 
-5. In a ll cases sales of crops comprise over 52 percent of gross income. Next to 
crop sales Groups one and three farm opera.tors have the greatest percentage 
12 
of sales from pork , while Croups two and four farm operators have the greatest 
percentage of sales from beef. 
Balance sheet 
T he balance sheet lists a ll that the business owns, its assets, a nd a ll that it owes, 
its liabilities . at a specified moment in time. Balance sheet as of January 1, 1991 are 
summarized by credit rat ioni ng classification. in Tables 3.6 and 3.10. 
:\ Iajor asset a nd liability st ructural differences apparent from the tab les include: 
1. Group Lwo farm operators, hold I he smallest amount of total assets and net 
worth. The total assets owned by Croup two farm operators a re significantly 
lower than those of Group t hree farm operators at five percent confidence level. 
Mean net worth of Group two farm opera.tors is lower t han that of Groups three 
and four farm operators. This indicates that t he internally credit rationed farm 
operators own relatiw,ly smaller amount of assets and claims on those asset.s. 
2. Group three farm operators own 1 he l<1rgcst dolla r worth of total assets and net 
worth than those of Cro11ps two and four farm operators. 
3. Group four farm op<'ralors <1re the lcas l indebted. owe significantly smaller 
a mount of li a bilities fo r lenders t han a ll oL her g roups. 
Compa rat ive income statem e nts 
T he comparative 1990 income sta tements provide a umma ry of revenues and 
expenditures of sample farm opC'ralors by cr<'dit ration ing classification are given 
Tables 3.7 and :3.11 . Severa l d ifferenc<'s among credit rationing groups are evident: 
Table 3.5: Farm operator characteristics by credit rationed groupsa 
Group l Group 2 Croup 3 Group 4 Sam ple mean 
Operator % 
Family cha racteristics 
Average age 
Years in farming 
Total dependents 
Dependen ts u nder 
18 years 
Husband educationc 
W ife education 
Sources o f gross 
farm in come 
Crops 
Pork 
Beef 
Dairy 
Other 
Total 
Land tenu re 
characteristics 
Total acres operated 
Acres owned 
Acres of renting land 
Acres rented 
3.0 
5 l.O 
(4)b 
2 .2 
2. 
0.7 
l. T 
1.3 
.5:3.S 
2-t.O 
16.0 
0 
6.2 
100.0 
.)10.0 
:21 ' .0 
207.5 
.) . ' 
a l 991 Iowa Farm Finance Su rvey. 
7.2 
56.0 
(3 4) 
32.7 
2.7 
0.6 
l. 7 
1.6 
.57.7 
1.5.3 
16. 
1.4 
100.0 
-H4.7 
235.0 
1 .s.o 
~.:3 
15.6 
19.0 
(2.-t) 
25.3 
:J.2 
L.0 
1. ., 
1.9 
.53.6 
22.2 
16.5 
:3.5 
·1.2 
100.0 
(j''.5.1 
:311..5 
'.3-15.0 
:2".6 
74.2 
60.0 
( 1,2.3) 
:36.0 
2.4 
0.3 
1.6 
1.5 
59.4 
14.6 
17.4 
1.5 
6.2 
100.0 
396.7 
250. 
173.5 
27.6 
100 
57.8 
34.0 
2.5 
.5 
1.6 
1.5 
58.2 
16. l 
17.2 
2.5 
6.0 
100.0 
43 .6 
25 .0 
204.8 
25.5 
bselecled group means significantly different from each other at 5 percent 
confidence level. are included \\'ii hin parent hcsis 
cIIighest education inst itulio n attended: I= high school, 2= community col-
lege 3= college, I= post graduate. 
Table 3.6: 1991 Comparative balance sheets by credit rat ion ing classification 
la 
Croup l Group 2 Croup 3 Group 4 Mean 
Assets 
C urrent assets 
Cash 
Financial investments 
Crops and livestock 
held for sale 
Intermediate as ets 
Machinery, equipment 
a nd breeding stock 
Long term assets 
Land a nd buildings 
Other assets 
Total assets 
Liabil ities 
\Ton real estate 
13ank 
Farm Credit System 
Fm HA 
Insu rance company 
Individual 
i\1e rchan I. / dealer 
Other loans 
Non real esta.t<' total 
:·.i. 7 4.~ 
10.13 
11 ·)') ... 
277. "12 
0 
.'500.05--1 
.:· 59. l:J I 
:LOOO 
~).095 
5,59 
l'.3.159 
9'2 
1,796 
$"7.825 
86,5-15 
11.0-1" 
.-)/.902 
(, 1,137 
259,513 
12,421 
$·131,566 
(3)b 
.:2 ' . ' :39 
2.01 , 
, . 7"6 
:J.2-12 
6.3 "6 
2,·157 
:~,820 
$55.!J l ... 
0 Source: 1991 Farm Financ<' Sun'<'\'. 
:·12,05 
I , . 32 
115.6 l 
1-14,206 
1:35,947 
17 ,396 
."' 774.120 
(2,4) 
.'',59.097 
5.324 
5. 702 
778 
.5 . 78 
:3. "27 
',023 
n .62!) 
816,041 
.j ,412 
69.577 
90,10" 
294 ,406 
0 
8528, 44 
(3) 
.-- 13. 33 
l ..! 72 
992 
369 
2,676 
1,102 
2,1 13 
$22.5.57 
814,214 
·16,224 
"3, 60 
9 ,9 6 
316,400 
4, 11 
8564,495 
.. 23.6 3 
2,193 
2.5 9 
661 
3,7 I 
1.651 
3,208 
.''37,766 
bSelected group means significant.I;· different from ea.ch other at 5 percent 
confidence level. are includ<'cl willtin tltc parenthesis 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
Real estate 
Bank $34,179 $6,451 $36,439 $13,465 $17 301 
Farm Credi t System 9,417 39,083 36 ,669 14,594 19,910 
F m HA 22,016 11 ,465 ",605 3 521 5,471 
Insurance company 17,990 10,600 •I ,171 4 041 5,515 
Individua l 5.27 22,94 34,537 9,622 14 573 
Merchant/dealer 0 243 118 177 167 
Other loans 1,062 155 2,95 262 718 
Real estate total $109,942 $90,945 $ J 23,·l97 M5,682 $63,655 
Total debt %197,TGI 8146.493 $2 L2.L 26 868,239 81 Ol ,421 
( ·l) (4) ( ·l ) (1,2,3) 
>!et worth .' 302.2"7 8:285,073 ."".561,994 .~460,305 8463,074 
1. Group three [arm operators have the highest gross incom e, gross farm income 
and net income. \ lean gross income of Group three is significant ly larger than 
that of all other groups. 
2. Group l wo farm operators have the lowest 11 et fa.rm income, whi le Group three 
farm operators have the highest. 
3. Group t.wo farm opera.I.ors have the greatest. acc rual off-farm income and th is 
off-sets the low net income of this farm operator group. 
4. Based o n classifi ca tion one, lhe externally c red it rationed borrowers (G roup 
one) have t he sma.l lc:st vn luc of net income using classification two Group four 
farm operators had the lowesL ne l income. 
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Table 3.7: 1991 Comparative income statements by credit rationing classifica-
ti on la 
Group l Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Mean 
Operator % 3.0 7.2 15.6 74.2 100 
Gross income $116.065 $125,202 $204,806 $110,292 $128,261 
(3)b (3) (1,2,4) (3) 
+ Net rental income 1,160 1,530 1,699 2,340 2,137 
+ Sale breeding stock 4,190 2,455 3,416 2,027 2,348 
Gross farm income 121A 15 129,187 209921 114.659 132 753 
- Operating expenses !) J .610 89,353 lH.902 74,6709 '8,875 
- Interest expense 17.'189 l5,391 17,536 7,873 10,355 
et cash farm income 12.316 24,443 -17,458 :32,177 33,523 
+ Inventory change 7,979 3,263 16,287 7,328 8,689 
Adjusted net cash income 20,295 27,706 63,770 39,505 42,212 
- Depreciat ion 14,073 10,597 21, 157 11,976 8,689 
Net farm income $6,222 $17.109 $42.613 827,529 S33,523 
\Vages and salaries l0.296 13.8.56 10.292 7,866 8,821 
+ Interest and dividends 1,513 l. l2:3 :3 .222 6,207 5.190 
+ Other income 9.000 26.571 .5 .877 -1, 133 6,268 
O ff farm income 20,809 ·11,850 19,391 18,206 20,279 
+ Capital ga ins :1,036 .5 .360 7001 17,941 4,346 
Accrual off far m income $23.8-15 $47,210 $26,392 $36,147 $24,625 
Net income $30,067 864,319 $69,005 863,676 $58,148 
Net cash income 833.12.5 $66,293 866.874.5 $50.3 3 $53,802 
asource: 1991 Farm Finance Sun·ey. 
bSelectcd group means which are significantly different from each other at 5 
percent confidence levf'l. are reporl<'d within the parenlhcsis 
Comparat ive finan cia l rat ios 
Several common fi nancia l ratios are summarized in t he Tables 3.8 and 3.14 re-
spective ly fo r cred it ra tioning group. Severa l diffe rences among groups are evident: 
1. G roup three operators perfo rmed t he bes t wit h t he highest re turn on assets 
(ROA), return on equity, interest coverage, net capital ra.tio a nd with sma llest 
debt to asset a nd leverage ra t ios ind icati ng t he most profitable and solvent 
group of the sample. 
2. G rou p one fa rm operators ha.Ye the highest dcbl to asset (0 / A) and leverage 
ratios. Group four farm operators have siguifkant ly lower D/ A rat io than that 
of the fa rm opera tors fou nd in groups one, two and three. The interest coverage 
ratio is negat ive, implying t he possibi lity of occurring solvency problems . T his 
group might face a substa nt ial burden of inte rest expend it ure on income. 
3. T he current rat io for Group two farm operators is smaller than other three 
groups, but still exceeds one, signifying of a strong liqu idity position. All farm 
operato rs may be ab le generate cash to meet l he ir cash demands. 
4. G roup two fa rm operators ha\·e smal ler ret urns on assels, ret urns on equi ty 
than an a\·crage fa rm operntor of the sample. reAecting of a compara ti ve lower 
profi tabi li ty. 
5. T he resu lts of Tables 3.S <111 cl :3. 1·1 indicate, lhat the businesses of t he in terna lly 
rat ioned borrowers a rc not as solvent as the businesses of Groups th ree and fou r 
farm operators (unconslrn incd fa rm operato rs), bu t is s till re fl ect. ive of a fairly 
good solvency position than Group one farm operators (exte rnally ra tioned 
farm operators) . 
The comparisons among credit constrained groups presented in this chapter 
shows many differences and as we ll as some similarities. Group three farm opera-
tors have the mos t fa,·orable income statemcnl and balance sheet . f nternally rationed 
farm operators (Group lwo) have t he highest off-farm income. G roup t hree operators 
appears to be the most profita ble and solvent group , t hey have the highest return 
on assets, equi ty and smallest d<'bt to asset and leverage ratios . Croup one farm 
operators may be unde rgoi ng solvency difficulties to some extent. 
Although compa rison of group means is a. si m ple techniq ue. it does not permi t 
a formal test of t he h,vpolhescs li sted in Cha pte r 1. T he next chapter focuses on 
the results o f multinomia l logit models estimated, lo test hypotheses indica ted in 
Chapter 1. 
Empirical Procedure 
Empiri cal models wi ll J,C' clC'signcd to tC's t hypotheses. incl uded in hapter 1. 
Models will a t tem pt lo l<'sl. whether credi t being limited by farmers t hemselves or 
by their lenders. by incorporat ing the estab li shed class ifications as endogenous de-
pendent vari ab les. Demographic anc.l financia l character istics together with plausible 
reasons for LI H'm lo limit use of credil. wil l be incl uded as independent (righl hand 
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Table 3.8: 1991 Comparative financial ratiosa and by credit rationing classifi-
cation 1 b 
Group l Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Mean 
Operator % 3.0 7.2 15.6 74.2 100 
Profitability Ratios 
Return on assets -0.3 1.6 4.4 2.2 3.2 
Return on equity -6.3 -2.9 6. 1 2.6 1. 7 
Cost of debt ) "I 10.5 ... ·) 11.5 10.2 l ·-
Solvency Ratios 
Debt to asset 19 .. 1 :33.9 27.4- 12.9 17.9 
( ,qc (4) ( 4) (1,2,3 ) 
Net Capital ratio 252.8 294.5 364.9 774.5 556.5 
Leverage ratio 65.4 51.3 37.7 14.8 21.9 
Interest Coverage -9.8 45.9 197.9 151.6 178.l 
ratio 
Efficiency ratios 
Gross ratio 101.-1 ' 6.9 ' 5.6 "' l.O 3.4 
Turn over ratio 2-J.2 29.9 27.11 21.69 23.5 
Liquidity ratios 
Current ratio 1-51.-5 1-11.0 199.0 638.5 382 
Fixed ratio 252.(i 28.5.:l :353. 0 644 .0 359.0 
aFinancial ratios are defined in Appendix 13 
bsource: 1991 Farm PinancC' Surny 
cselected group means which are s-ignificanLl y different from each other at 5 
percent confidence le,·eJ. are reported within the parenthesis 
.:so 
Table 3.9: 1991 Comparat iv<' demograp hic characterist ics by credit ra tioning 
classification 2a 
Group l Group 2 (: l'OU p 3 Group 4 Sample mean 
Operator % .s.5 l0.5 13.0 71.0 100 
Fam ily characteristics 
Ave rage age ..J9.0 52.0 -19 .0 61.0 57.8 
(4)b (3,4) (2,4) (3,2, l) 
Years in farming 26.0 29.0 2.5. 36. 34.0 
Total dependents :J. l :3 .0 :3.2 2.3 2.6 
Dependents under l.O 0. " 1.0 0.3 0.5 
l years 
Husba nd educationc l.9 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.6 
Wife education 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.6 
Sources of Gross 
Fa rm fncome 
C rops 56.2 .s .7 .52.6 59.3 5 .2 
Pork 19.0 15.8 23.7 14.5 16. l 
Beef 17.0 17.5 16.2 17.4 17.2 
Other 5.7 ·1.6 3.9 6.6 6.0 
Total 
Land tenure 
characteristics 
Total acres opera Led .15 .0 .)23.3 G31.0 3 0.0 43 .6 
Acres owned 276.5 2'17. ;j :305.4 250.0 25 .0 
Acres of renting land 298 .. 5 288.8 :354.0 157.7 204.8 
Acres rented 17.0 t:3.0 28.4 27.6 25.5 
a source: 1991 Fa rm Finance Sun•c\·. 
bsetected grou p means wlt ich ore signi ficantly d iffe rent from each other at .5 
percent confidence level. are reported with in the parenthesis 
cHighest educat ion i nsti lu lion altc>nded: 1 = high school, 2= community col-
lcge. 3= college, 4= post gradual<'. 
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Table 3.10: 1991 Comparat ive balance sheets by credit rat ioning classifica-
tion 2a 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Mean 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash $11,287 $5,230 810,774 $16,632 $14,214 
Financial Investments 7,280 17,128 21,467 .59,679 46 224 
Crops and Li vestock J 55,.s~18 82,71 5 l35.176 66,012 83 860 
held for sale 
Intermediate Assets 
Machinery, equipment133 . ..,78 lOl ,599 136,569 ... 7,1 2 98,986 
and breeding stock 
Long te rm Assets 
Land and Building :389,828 262,621 -119 ,742 295,625 316,400 
Other assets 0 32,777 27,534 0 4811 
Total Assets $697,821 $.502.070 8751.262 $.525,130 $564 495 
(:J )b (2,4) (3) 
Liabilities 
Non Real Estate 
Bank $75,565 $27, l53 $52,580 $13,468 $23,683 
Farm Credit System 1.9 2,138 G, 195 1,387 2,193 
Fm HA 10.539 3,991 4.444 1,384 2,589 
Insurance Com pany l .128 2,027 612 432 661 
In di vi dua l 2.14 6 6,99 \902 2,435 3,781 
Mercha n L / Dealer 2.S5·l 1,914 3.631 1,128 1,651 
Othe r loans 14.4472 -1 ,960 4.114 1,875 3,208 
Non Real Estate total $108,692 $49,481 ~80.7.J. S $22, 109 $37,766 
asource: 1991 Farm finance Sun·cy. 
bSelected group mea ns which are signi fi cantly different from each other at 
5 percent confidence level. a rc reported wilhin t he parenthesis 
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Table :3.10 (Conlinue<l) 
Real Estate 
Bank 37 ,427 
Farm C redit. System '1 ",272 
FmHA 17,9110 
Insurance Company 7, ".59 
Individual 
Merchant /Dealer 
Other loans 
Real Estate Total 
Total Debt 
1 et \Vorth 
27...15·1 
0 
3,631 
s 142.5 :3 
.:251.275 
( -1 ) 
.''-1-16 .. 5 IG 
21,222 
26,625 
7.018 
7.319 
22.103 
163 
797 
s 5,2-H 
$134.72 
(-I) 
:· :36 7 ,3-12 
35,551 
26,097 
7,503 
9,711 
:J t .375 
1-13 
2,278 
8112.65 
$193; 106 
( -l) 
11,543 17,301 
15,352 19,910 
3,829 5,471 
4,234 5 515 
9,115 14. ,573 
186 167 
16 718 
B-14,427 863,655 
$101,421 
8·163.074 
side) variables, to determine the characterist ics of credit constrained and uncon-
stra ined farm operators, consistent with classifications. Thus. a discrete regression 
model may be appropriate Lo handle the qualitati,·C' nature of the dependent variable. 
Explanat ion o f the technique 
The cred it. constrained and unconstrained groups displayed in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
provide im portant in forma t io11 about the farming operation, limited use of credit. 
limited prontabiliLy etc. ,\ multinomial logit model is used to predict the relati ve 
probability that an ind ividual will fall into any of the four categories given in the 
Tables 3.3 and 3A. 
A variab l which dcfin s LhC'sc categories in an.v order desired is known as an 
unordered v<1riable. '.\lulti110111ial logit model. i~ one procedure which does allow 
both an arbitrary numb<' r of categories or respons<·s and continuous right hand side 
variables (Theil. 1974). Thus unorde red mullinomial logit model will be employed in 
Table 3.11: 1991 Comparative income statements by credit rationing classification 
2a 
Group l Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Mean 
Operator % 5.5 10.5 13.0 71.0 100 
Gross Income $173,230 $142,266 $199,906 Sl06,829 Sl28 261 
+ Net Rental Income 1,989 1,781 1,471 2 339 2,137 
+ Sale Breeding Stock 2,875 2,532 3,782 1,997 2,348 
Gross Farm Income 81 78.09·1 .'.'146,579 $205.1 59 8111,165 8132,753 
- Operating Income 124,569 9 ,871 l-12 ,695 72,179 "8,875 
- Interest Expenses 21,673 13,598 15,943 7,762 10,355 
Net Cash Farm Income $31,852 $34 ,110 $46,521 $31,224 833,523 
+ Inventory Change 21,.127 2,580 12,382 7,648 8,689 
Adjusted Net Cash Income S.53,279 $36.690 858,903 $38,872 $42,212 
- Depreciation 18,689 12,227 20,700 11,790 ,689 
et Farm Income $34.590 $24,463 838,203 827,082 $33,523 
Wages and Salaries 13.249 16.903 9,16.5 7,090 ,821 
+ Interest a od Di vidends 1,764 1,920 3.446 6,367 5,190 
+ Other Income L 1,2 11 10,964 4.231 5,482 6,268 
Off Farm Income :.W,297 29,787 lG,842 18,939 20,279 
+ Capital Gains :J .905 :3,637 7,466 3.83L1 4,346 
Accrual Off Farm Income $:30 ,202 $33,424 $24,308 822, 773 $24,625 
Net Income $64.792 857 ,S "7 $62,511 $49, 55 858,148 
)let Cash Income .'.'.5" .1'19 863. 97 % 3.363 8.50.1 63 853,802 
asource: 1991 Farm finance Smw·y. 
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Table 3.12: 1991 Comparative Financial ratios by credit rationing classification 
2a 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Mean 
Operator % 5.5 10.5 13 71 100 
Profitabili ty Ratios 
Return on assets 4.4 2.5 3.8 1.8 3.2 
Return on equity 2.20 -.2 2.3 0.4 1.7 
Cost of debt 8.6 10.0 "' .2 11.6 10.2 
Solvency ratios 
Debt to assets 36.0 26.0 25.7 12.6 17.9 
(4)b (4) (4) (1,2,3) 
Net Capital ratio 277.7 372.6 388.4 789.2 556.5 
Leverage ratio 56.3 36.6 34.6 14.5 21.9 
Interest Coverage 142.2 92.87 180.1 121.2 178.1 
ratio 
Efficiency ratios 
Gross ratio 90.9 ' .5 .6 "'5.9 80.5 83.4 
Turn over ratio 25.5 2D.2 :n.3 :H.l 23.5 
Liquidity ratios 
Curren t rat io 160.2 212.3 207.3 643.7 382 
Cash Flows 6.2 9.3 .5.9 5.2 5.1 
Fixed rat io 273.4 ·192.3 :372.5 665.4 497.0 
asource: 1991 Farm fin a 11cc Su rvev. 
bselected group means "'hich are si.gn ificant at 5 percent confidence level, are 
reported withi n the pa renthesis 
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this study to reflect the basic qualitative characteristics of these categorical groups. 
Multinomial logit technique 
The logit model is based on the logistic cumulat ive distribution function (Judge 
et a l. , 1988). Logistic dis tribution is the cumulative distribution of the hyperbolic 
secant-square (sech2) distribution and is specified as : 
(3.1) 
where: 
Pi is the probability that an event occurs, in this case the probability of an individual 
will be categorized in to one group; 
Xi denotes the vector of cross sect ional va lues of the explanatory variables . 
The logit model .is used to predict the probability that an observed dependent 
variable that is linearly re la.Led Lo a set of independent va,ria.bles will fall into a specific 
category (Turvey and Brown .1991). for a,pplications the equation (3.1) may be easily 
linearized into: 
(3.2) 
This fundion is called the logit or P;. so that t he name of the logit analysis was 
derived (Greene, 1990). 
The dependent variable in this rC'gression is the logari thm of t he odds that a 
particular choice will be ma.de. This model transforms t he problem of predicting 
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probability within a (0, 1) interval to the problem of predicting the odds of an event 
occurring with in the range of the real number line. 
When the dependent variable is polychotomous and unordered instead of d i-
chotomous, t.he multinomial logit. can be deri ved directly from the equation 3.2. 
If there ex ists '1m" categories and P1 , P2 , ..... Pm are the probabil ities associated 
with these categories then: 
P · J 
/ 3jX 
1.i \ (j = I, 2,. .. . m - I ) 
L + ''!i-1 eJJj-
L-J= l 
I 
l ,m-1 J1·X + L-j=l l 
(3.3) 
(3.4 ) 
This model is commonly referred lo as the multinomial logit model (Maddala, 1983). 
This model implies t.li aL we ca n comput.e 111 - l log odds ratios (Greene, 1990). 
Accordingly, the multinomia l logit model can also be ex pressed as by the probabil ity 
of an observation falling in to one class relative to a base reference class say the last 
m, by simplify ing equations :J.:3 and :3 .4 WP oblain 
P · 
_J 
Pm 
P· 
In-) 
Pm 
j = 1,1 ..... .. m - l 
Therefore in a mode l wit It fo11r nitegori es Lhe logit model can be written as: 
In!}_ 
p.J o I + JL X 
p.) 
.1']) ': In-= 02 + P4 
P.3 
l111p-
"' 
ct;3 + ri:3 X 
(:3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3. ) 
(3.9) 
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The coefficients in this model are difficult to interpret (Greene, 1990). The 
estimated coefficients do not indicate the increase in the probability of the event 
occurring, given a one unit increase in t he corresponding independent variable, rather 
P · 
the coefficients reflect the e!Tect of a change in a n independent variable on logit P/n 
(Judge et al., 1988). 
The logit coefficients can be transformed in to linear mutually exclusive prob-
abi lities, through equation 3.3. The probability of an observation falling into the 
reference group "m" can be determined by equation 3.-L Further the partial deriva-
tives of equations 3.3 and 3A . allow ll !; to find the marginal effects of the regressors 
on the probabilities. 
8P·· _!1_ 
fJX· i 
8Pim 
8X· i 
m-1 
P7 j f3 j - P; j L Pi t.:f3 k j = l , 2,.., m k = 1, 2, .. , m - 1 ( 3 .10) 
k=l 
m-1 
- -Pim L Pit.:f3k 
k=l 
(3.11) 
The logit partial derivatives are analogous to linear regression coefficients. The 
magnitude and lhe signs of the partial derivatives indicate how changes in the value 
of the regressor change the probability that, an individual will fall into a specific 
category. A positi ve sign indicates an increase in "X" leads to an increase in the 
predicted probability while a negat ive sign indicates an increase in HX" leads to a 
decrease in the predicted probabi li ty. 
The significance of a. logit model is tested us ing likelihood ratio statistic. This 
stat istic is asymptot ically distributed as 'hi squared stat istic with degrees of freedom 
equal lo the number of groups lim<'s the parameters estimated. 
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Variables to Predict Credit Rationing 
The literature suggests tha t both demographic and financial characteristics are 
likely to characterize credit-ra tioned borrowers. In this section variables included in 
the logit model are briefl y described. 
Demographic char acteristics 
Age Age of farm operators m n.y be closely linked to expectations farmers have 
about their future and t heir fa rm bus iness. Therefore t he farm operators in different 
age groups may hold d iffe rent perceptions about borrowing. In accordance with life 
cycle theory, younger farm ers invesl more as t hey a re t rying to increase their level of 
income . In contrast, older farm ers who have reached a reasonable income and farm 
size may reduce investment and t hen d isinvest as they near or reach retirement age 
(Ladue et al. 1991) . \Vhittaker (1991) found t ha t the proportion of farmers without 
debt increases wi t h increasing age. T hus the yo unger farmers tend to borrow more 
funds in order to achieve t hei r goals. such as staying in business, in creasing net worth 
and farm profits while t he fa rm operato rs in s ixty or over age reduce borrowing since 
they had already achie,·ed t his goa l ( \Vise, 1983). 
J appelli (1990) ind icated l hat externally and inte rnally credit constrained con-
sumers a.re younger t han the u11cons t.rained consumers. Thus it may be unlikely the 
older fa rm operators. who !tad cs ta blisltcd a good credit hi story would be ex te rnally 
credit rationed. Also the rea r of poss ible rejection ma.y also keep younger farmers 
from requesting loans. T he refore. t here may be greater probability t hat younger 
farmers also to be in ternaJl y credi t ra t ioned. 
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Educat ion Education is hypothesized to contribu te positively to the extent of 
credit use. As the theory indicated. the level of formal education may improve one's 
knowledge, self-confidence and altitude toward agri culture. Thus a farm operator 
with better education might be expected to adopt new technology on risk manage-
ment strategies in farming and would be more likely to consider the use of credit as a 
necessary means to success. This would suggest that a better educated farm operator 
is less like ly to be internal credit rationed. Moreover a better educated farm operator 
would tend to use credit more efficiently and would be Jess likely to be externally 
rationed. 
Experience In general, Lhe age of the farm operator is positively related to the 
number of years being farm ed. Hence as the literature slated young, less experienced 
farm operators are expected to use more debt and also to be externally credit rationed. 
Lenders would tend to view lack of experience as an indicator of inefficient farm 
business, and are more hesitant to extend credit to such farm business (Lee et al., 
1988). It is also possible tha t less experienced farm operators would be internal credit 
rationed. due to unestablished credit hi story and inexperience in farming. 
N umber of d ependents The famil y li ving expenses tend to increase with 
number of de pendents. The difference between the net farm income a nd the total 
used for family living represents the amount availa.ble to t he farmer for payment for 
income taxes , savings in lhe farm business or debt ret irement (Judd. 1991). The 
greater the numbe r of dependents, Lile smaller th is difference. As Lhe family living 
expenses increase. finan cia.l performance may decrease. farm operators wi t h larger 
families may be nrnre likely to be externally rationed ( Lee et al., 1988). 
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Farm size Fa.rm size, in this study is measured by the acres of land operated 
including land owned and rented. Size of farm is likely to influence the probabili ty 
of a. farmer using credit for a number of reasons. F.irst, the larger the size, the larger 
the inputs needed to operate the fa rm. Also la rge farms tend to use relatively more 
purchased inputs, due Lo Lhe commercial nature of their operations. Second, land is 
generally the ma.in collateral t he farmer can offe r to a credit inst itution . Therefore 
we expect, a prio ri , that Lhe probabi li ty of a farmer using credi t will di rectly related 
to the size of hi s farm (Bagi, 1983) . furthe rmore. as t he literature emphasized , farm 
operators ' wit h more assets are less like ly to externally rat ioned (J a.p pelli , 1990). It 
is a lso possible t hat internal savings would increase wit h farm size. Consequent ly, 
large operations may be considered more credit worthy. The li kelihood that they will 
be internal credit rationed may decrease. 
Financial characterist ics 
Net farm income :'\PL Parm Income is the amount available for family living, 
income taxes, a nd savi ngs. IIigh net farm income indicates higher debt repayment 
capacity. As t he literatu re stated, farm operators with high net farm income is less 
likely to be extern ally const rained. ~ l oreover , fa rm operators may be able to re-
organize thei r fa rms :; ucccssl'u lly, under t he repayment condit ions associated with 
credit , thus fa.rm operators \\' it h high neL fa.rm income a re negatively hypothesized 
to be internal credit rationed. 
Debt to asset rat io (DAR) One important solvency measu re is the ratio 
of total de bt Lo assets. Tl1is lllC(l.Sures the fi rm's total obligat ions Lo creditors as a 
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percent of the total assets. A high DAR may indicate financial stress and therefore 
an increased likelihood for credit rationing. 
Gross income p er dollar of expense (GTE) The GTE for this study is 
measured by taking the ra tio of gross income per dollar of expense. The GTE is 
an indicator of cost control and an overall measure of efficiency in use of resources. 
Other th ings being equal, a higher ratio indicates a high net income (Lee et al., 1988) . 
T hus lenders may be more wi ll.i ng to extend credi t to t he individuals with high net 
income or with high GTE. Therefore GTE is expected t.o negatively related to credit 
rationing. 
Liquidity ratio Liquidi ty management is a principal means by which farmers 
cope with variations in cash flows tha t ari se from uncertain commodity pr.ices, yields 
and production costs (13a.rry, Baker and Sanint , 1981). Cash and near-cash items 
such as financial in vestments are considered as highly liquid assets. Thus a ratio of 
these highly liquid assets t.o the total available assets gives an approximate measure 
of the fi rm 's liqu id ity. The liquidi ty rat io specifies the value of highly liquid assets 
relative to total assets (13arry el a l. , 19"7). T he higher the rat io, the greater the 
firm 's abili ty to meet short -term obl igations. A highly liq uid farm business is less 
liable to be credit r<'ltioned. 
Mean net worth \fel \\'Orth indicates the value of the cla ims on assets by 
the owner. The greater the net \\'Ort h the greater capacity to absorb or cover the 
fi nancial and production risk. The li krat. ure has indicated that t he probability of 
credit decreases as mean net \\'Orth increases. Thus it is expected that the probability 
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of credit rationing decreases as mean net. wort.h increases. 
Returns on assets (ROA) 
T his provides a measure of the profitability of the production and marketing 
activities of the business that. is separated from the financing function (Barry et 
al., 19 7). Increase of net. farm income holding interest expenses a nd total asset.s 
indicates, increase of ROA. 1\ s the net farm income increases the probabi li ty of an 
individual being internal and/or <'Xt.<'rnal credit raLioned declines. 
Reasons to limit borrowin g 
1991 Farm Finance SurvC'y gaLhered. information about particular reasons for 
limi ted borrowing by farm operators, at situations, when lender offered credit avai l-
ab le to them. The models wil l include those reasons as explanat.ory dummy variables. 
1. To maintain credit reserve. 
An individual's unused capacit.y Lo borrow funds is know n as the credit reserve. 
It is a central fc<tturc i11 th, process of unders tanding the use of debt capital 
(Ba ke r. I 968). The q11antiLa.Liv<' Pxpress io11 for c redit reserve was described 
as the difference betwr<'n n1pital limits imposed by external credit rationing 
and the amount. acLually borrowed by the 1wrson (Barry and Baker, 1971 ). 
It is cons idered t he clc'cision lo maintain a credit reserve as a form of risk 
averse behavior in responsc to uncertainly ( 13arry and Baker, 1971). T hus as 
a risk averse indi vid11nl. becomes uncertai 11 about lhe conditions in which they 
operate'. they Lend to ration crcdil inlernt\lly. Thus the decision to maintain 
l ROA = (ne t .farm inco111c+inlrresl paid-family li1 ing expen~cs) 
ualtte of j arm a ... 8cls 
63 
credit reserve could be hypothes ized directly tot.he probabilit.y of internal credit 
rationing. ~foreover an individuals. whose credit reserve is almost exhausted. 
are inclined more to be externally credit rationed. 
2. High in t.erest rates. 
High int.erest rates reduce t.he demand for loans. Presumably higher interest 
rates make more invcslments financially infeasible. and thus result in external 
credit rationing. fore importantly t.he risk averse individuals, tend to refuse 
borrowing, when t.hey view the terms ror available cred it. specified by t.he insti-
tution are so slringe11t.. So Lhat. high interes t rates a re expected to contribute 
posit. ivcly for the probability of an individual to be in ternally and/or externally 
credit rationed. 
3. Lende rs' unwillingness. 
Farmers may not request. for financing, when they are aware of possible rejection 
by the lende rs. T hus as the li terature stated probability of credit rationing 
increases with the lenders ' unwillingness. 
-l. Planning to transfe r. 
The close householcl-b11si11<>ss relationship of most farms and ranches closely 
links t.h e life cycle or the firm to the life cycle oft.h e operator. Thus the farm 
ope rat.o r 's objeclivC's mny cha nge o\·er the life of the firm ( Ba rry et al. , 19 7). 
The form operato rs r<.'nclied I ransfcr stage, "re long on ex perience and capi tal 
but. short on energy and length of planning hori zon. Expansion of wealth and 
income generating rapncity may bf'come less important and inves tments with 
fast.er pay backs arc pr<'fNrecl (Lee ct. al., 198 ). Thus as the theoretical mode l 
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indicated. the percenl of farmers without debt increases with the age. Whit-
taker ( 1991) indicale<l that for the eldest. age group. sixty-five years and older 
about seventy percent do not hold any farm debt. Thus farm operators t hose 
who are p lanning to tnrnsfcr in near future, may not request for farm debt. 
Model Specificat ion 
The multinomial tecl111ique was used Lo est imate two basic sets of probability 
prediction models for the C'l'C'dit constrained groups described in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
respectively. The explanatory variables of lhc models include the variables repre-
senting demographic and financial characteristics oft.he farm operators as well as the 
indicated reasons to limit ed borrowing. 
Two bas ic pred iction models for cred it rationing were developed with different 
explanatory vari ables. Furthermore two comprehensive models were developed by 
combining all the signific;im ,·ariables in the l wo basic models. The estimated models 
are listed as follows: 
( L) ro r cred it rationing tl<1ssification one: 
P· 1 
log PJ 
1n 
o + .11A9e + J2TS1 + d:3TS2 + d-4 ,\f FT 
+ .1.)CTE + 36 .\J.\'ll' + 37DAR + 3-.L /Q 
+ 1i fif NT+ JwCflE. 
6.5 
(2) For credi t rationing classification two; 
+ (35/Vf NW + (35 DAR 
+ (37LIQ + /3gCRE. 
(3) The comprehensive model for credit raLioning classifi cation one; 
P ·1 
log-1-
Pm 
a + f31Age + /32TS1 + (J3TS2 + (J4FS 
+ J:J5 Edu + /35 N FI+ .th GTE + fJs J\tf NvV 
+ /39DAR + fJ10LIQ + /311INT + fJ12C RE. 
(4) The comprehensive model for credit rationing classification two; 
P·? 
log J,;, = a + r3tAge + 132TS1 + f33TS2 + /34FS 
+ /35Edu + /35N FI + ,B7GT E + /3gJ\f NvV 
+ t3a DAR + /J10LIQ + .i311 I NT + /3i2C RE. 
where: 
a= In tercept. 
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TS1 =Transfer in 5 years (A dummy rnriable) 
TS2=Transfer in 10 years (A dummy variable) 
Edu =The level of formal education (l=high school. 2= community college, 3= col-
lege, 4= post graduate) 
NFI = e t Farm Income ($) 
GTE =Gross income pe r dollar of expenses (8/S) 
MNW =~lean Net worth ($) 
DAR = Debt lo assets rat.io (8/$) 
LIQ =Liqu idity ratio (':-Sr) 
L T = £liglt interest rates (. \ dummy nniablc) 
CRE =Wi llingness to maintain credit reserve (a dummy variable) 
Pj l ,2 = Probabili ty or i t h individual to categorized 
in to j th group. for j=l.2,3 according to 
classification one or l\\'o. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
T his chapte r presents the results of the logit maximum likel ihood estimating 
equations. The variables i11 cluded in t he mode l correspond Lo operator and financial 
characterist ics as wel l as !:ipccificd reasons to li mit borrowing. The first part of this 
chapter describes the results of Lhe models one and two, specified in chapter three. 
The second part of the chapter contains the results obtained from comprehensive 
mode ls. 
Model One 
l\fodel o ne tests, adeq uacy of credit lo rural farm sector by incorporating the in-
format ion of the credit ra li o11 ing classification one as endogenous dependent variable. 
Table 4.1 presents est imated logit co<'fficients a nd ntri a ble specific ch i-square statis-
t ics. The model ch i-square stati stic was 1122 with '.J ~j degrees of freedom, indicating 
that the amount of \"ariation explained by the model was sig ni ficant ly different from 
zero a l the 0.001 level. The .. pseudo-R'.2,, gives an indication o( Lhe goodness of fit. 
The pseudo R square1 fo r model one was 0.90, giv ing a n adequate indication for the 
1 Pseudo R1 is defined as : 
•) ·) 
P seudo R2 = [1 - ( k )tJ/t - ( ! ...... )n: where Lw is the maximum of likelihood Ln Lmax 
function using only a constant. Ln. is the maximum using all var iab les and Lmax is 
Lhe maximum poss ibl e' (Cragg and Uh ler. 1970). 
6 
goodness of fit. l\1aximum likelihood estimates indicated the direction of a variable's 
influence on probability. llowcvcr the interpretations of the individual parameters. 
must be done with care, since left hand side is the logari t hm of the odds of the 
choice, not actual probability. Va.riable chi-square statistics are presented within the 
paranthesis. Virtually all parameters are signif1canLly different from zero at least at 
the 10 percent con fidcnce level. 
The signs of the paramel<'rs are generally as expected to priori reasonmg. For 
instance the resu lts dcmonstr<t!.c that the old<'r farm operators are more likely to 
be in Group four relative to :roups one. two and three. Farm operators intend to 
transfer in five years are le:ss likely to shift in to ;roups one and three relative to 
Group four, they are more lik<'ly to shift in Lo Croup two relaLi,·e Lo Group four. The 
likelihood coefficients associated with NFI indicates, the great.er the NFI the smaller 
the probability that an i11dividual lo be classified in Lo Groups one and two relative 
to Group four. The coerficicnts of GTE (Gross income/Total expenses) imply that an 
individual with higher GTE has a lesser probability Lo fall in lo Group one relative 
to Group four. C real.er Lhc 11ct worl.h of an operator. the smal ler the probability of a 
farm operator Lo be in Croups one and two, rC'lalivc to Croup four. while probability 
to be in Group three relati,·<' to Group four increases. Furthermore the probability of 
farm operator LO fall in to Croups one. two and t liree relati,·e Lo Croup four increases 
with high debt to assets ratio. The results also indicates that higher liquidity ratio, 
decreases the probability that an indi,·idual Lo fall in Lo Groups one, two and three 
relative to Group four. Tl1<' rc•sulls indicates that Lite limited borrowing due to high 
interest rat.cs wa.s directly rc•latccl lo the probability lo be in Group one relative Lo be 
in Group four. Those farm 01wrn lors. indicatC"d willingness to maintain cred it reserve, 
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Table 4 .1: ~laximum likelihood estimates for the model onea 
Variables Chi-square value logp; 
? 
logp; logp: 
Intercept 25.2*** 3.7** -1.3* :3.5*** b 
( 1.5) (0.9) (0.8) 
Age 63.2*** -0.07*** -0.007 -0.08*** 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Transfer in 5years 7.5** -0.5.+: 0.05 -0.5*** 
(0.3) (0.3) (0.2) 
Transfer in l Oyears 9.7-+<* -0.6"""'* 0.3* 0.06"' 
(0.2) (0.2) (0.1) 
Net Farm I ncorne .5 .4* -l.3E-6 -3.2E-6 3. 1 E-6* 
( 4 .2E-6) (2.9E-6) (1.7E-6) 
Liquidity Ratio ".6* -3.03 -3. 7*** -1. 7* 
(2.3) ( 1.6) ( 1.0) 
Debt/ Assets 12. l ** 0.6 0.6* 1.2*** 
(0.7) ( 0.4) (0.3) 
\ lean J t worth lJ.l'+<* -9.9£- 7 -1.7£-(j** 1.1 E-6*** 
( 1.3E-6) ( .9E-7) ( 4.3E-7) 
GTE 5.-J * - 1.3"' 0.01 -OA* 
(0. 7) ( 0.0..J.) (0.3) 
Credit Ti cscrvc :3-1. 7"'** -0. :J* -0.02 -0.6*** 
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) 
High Interest Rates - -*".+: 1.1 0.0 " -0.3*** -0.2* 
(0.2) ( 0.1) ( 0.1) 
a source: 1991 Iowa Farm Fina11cc S11rvcv. 
1""=signific;int at 10 pcrc<' 11 L, '"'=s ignifi c~rnl aL .5 percent.*"""= s ignificant at l per-
cent level. 
70 
as one reason for limited borrowing, a re less likely to be class ified in to Groups one, 
two and three relat ive t.o Group fou r. 
For further in terpretations logit coefficients were translated in to probability pre-
diction equations which are usually referred to as multinomial logit model (Equations 
3.3 and 3.4), using the mean values of independent variables, for specified values of 
"X". Partial deri vat.ives of Equations 3.3 and 3.4, a re calculated using the derived 
probabilities (P[j s and Pim) and regression co-efficients as specified in Equations 
3.10 and 3.11. Figures 4. l , 4. :2. -±.3 show . how the probability of classifying in to 
specified groups vary with age, clcbl/assels. ancl farm s ize, while olher variables are 
held at mean values. 
Accordingly a typical farm operator in the sample would have 0.809 probability 
to classifying into Group four. The nex t most likely group to be categorized would 
be Group three, fo llowecl by Groups two and one. The results also indicate that the 
probability of an operator to be in ternall y crecl it constrained exceeds the probability 
of being external credit constrained. f\'loreover the proba bility of farm operator to be 
liquidi ty constrained is approximately eight percent. 
The signs of Lhc partiaJ probabili t ies present in Table 4.2 , provide meaningful 
informat ion and a.re consistent wit.h t he signs of the logit coefficients presented in 
Table 4 .1. for instance as age advances from Lhe meant.he probabi lity of t he operator 
fall ing in to Groups one and three would decrease, wh ile likelihood of shifting in 
to Groups two and four would increase. (As shown by Lhe Figure 4.1) Figure 4.2 
indicates t.he l.ikelihood of a farm operator shifting in to Groups one, two, and t hree 
increases, with high debt to asset ratios. while lhe likelihood of s hifting to group four 
decreases (Figure ti .2). 
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Table 4.2: Probabilities and partial derivatives al Lhe sample means for the 
model onea 
Group l Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Probabilities 0.020 0.0·100 0.14 0.8 
Age -0.001 0.0002 -0.01 0.1 
Transfe r in .Syears -0.00:J 0.0191 -0.01 0.3 
Tran s f e r in l Oyears -0.01 .5 0.0127 0.01 -0. l 
Net Fa rm l ncome --l 8- ... -1.58-7 3.58-7 - l.6E-7 
Liquidity Ratio -0.064 -0.14·1 ... -0.16 0.3 
Debt/ Assets 0.012 0.0211 0.13 -0.2 
~ fean Nel worth -:2. 6 E-~' -7. E-S l.36E-7 -:3.2E-
GTE -0.0:32 0.00·1·1 -0.04 0.7 
Creel i L Hcserve -0.00G 0.0029 -0.06 0.1 
High In t.crest Rates 0.0:2'' -o.01:n -0.01 0.1 
a sou rec: l 991 farm I· inn nc<' Survey. 
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Model Two 
fodel two is a lso designed. to test the adequacy of credit to rural farm sector. 
by incorporati ng the information of credit rationing class ification two (Table 3.4). 
The logit co-efficients and the variable ch i-squares of both financial and demograph ic 
variab les a re presented in Table 4.3. T he model chi-square is 1283 with 27 degrees 
of freedom, which is significanl al the .001 confidence level. Pseudo R2 was 0. 73. 
With this model additional ,·nriables appeared to be significant, while some of the 
variables in the model one bC'came nonsignificant. 
Variables including intention to Lransfer in lO years. N Fl, GTE and high in-
terest rates were not significant. while farm size and education became s ignificant. 
Accord ingly large fa.rm operators would more likely to be in group one, two and 
t hree, relative to group four. Figure 4.3 shows clearly, the probabili ty of shifting in 
to Groups one, two a.nd three increases with farm size. Group three farm operators 
are more likely to operate larger operations. More educated farm operators would 
more likely to be in Group 011c <rnd two relati,·e to group four. Except these two 
variables results of the other parnmelers are the same for both models. 
As with model one the lypirnl farm operator would have the greatest probability 
of falling in to Group four. :'-Jext most likely to be in Group three, followed by 
Groups two and one. The results of this classification also state, the probability 
of a farm operator Lo be in ternal credit rat ioning is h igher than a farmer to be 
external credit const rained. The probability of a. farm operator being credit rationed 
would be approximately twcln' percent. not significantly different from the results of 
class ifi cation one (Table -1.-! ). 
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gori Ps by farm size 
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T able <l.3 : ;..raximum like lihood estimates for the model twoa 
Variables Chi -Squa re value log-p; log-i Jog~ 
Intercept 17.21*** 2.211 9* 0.1954 3.4171 ***b 
(1.1677) (0.9257) (0.8629) 
Age 6 .45** -0.0875** -0.04 74 *** -0.0962*** 
(0.0l 78) (0.0122) (0.0129) 
Tra nsfe r in .)years 10.05** -0.6 l59** 0.5481 * -0.3461 * 
(0.2657) (0.3720) (0.2130) 
Farm Size 9.G "** 0.0006:35* 0.00 14** 0.00094*** 
(0.0004.56) (0.000363) (0.000331) 
Education 7.00* 0.0678 0.1955* -0.1614* 
(0.1.529) (0.1107) (0.1147) 
Liquidi ty Ra tio 1.6-l * -2.9330* -2.4747** -1.9754* 
( 1.9119) ( 1.2073) (1.1473) 
Debt / Assets l0.6 *** 1.4721 *** 0.5312 l.0361 *** 
(0 .50.5.5) (0.4461 ) (0.4249) 
Mean Net worth 7.3 "* 8.187E-" -l.36E-G** 7.318E - 7* 
( 7.881 E-7) (7. 152E-7) ( 4.69 E-7) 
Credit Reserve 36.25*** -0.5263*** -0.09 3 -0.6690*** 
(0.16:3 ) (0.1257) (0.1194) 
a 1991 Iowa Farm fi nance S11rw·v. 
b"'=s ignificant al LO percent, 0'~sign i ficanL al .5 percent.*"'"'= signi ficant at 
l percent. 
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Table 4.4: Probabilities and partial derivatives calculated at the sample 
means for the model twoa 
Group l Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Probabilities 0.0.53 0.062 0.106 0.779 
Age -0.00:37 -0.001 4 -0.00824 0.1376 
Transfer in 5years -0.03 0.036 -0.0326 0.027 
Farm Size 2.4E-5 3.91 E-5 7.95E-5 -1.41 E-4 
Education 0.00365 0.01232 -0.0168 0.000849 
Liquidity Hatio -0.1280 -0.1217 -0.090 2 o. 7075 
Debt/ Assets 0.06655 0.0195 0.0 35 -0.1680 
Mean Net worth 58-9 -8.4E-7 7..SE-8 4£-9 
Cred it Reser\'e -0.0223 3.65E-4 -0.0593 0.0 117 
a source: 1991 l"arm Pinancc Survey. 
C ompre hensive Model One 
Comprehensive model one intends to confirm the findings of model one. It fits 
a ll the expla natory vari ables find in models one and two, wi t h the dependent variable 
describing t he in formation of cred it rationing class ificat ion one. 
T he resu lts indicate variables including farm size, education, TFI and GTE are 
non signi ficant, with the comprehensive model one. IIowever the interpretations of 
t he NFI a nd GTE presented in model one stil l hold for this model s ince signs of t he 
coefficients a re uncha nged . The sign of the parameter associated with the level of 
formal education in the case of Group two. is positive though not signi ficant. The 
estimates associated with the farm size confirmed the resu lts given in model two. 
The fa rm operators with larger operations are more likely to sh ift in to Groups one, 
two and three, re lat ive Lo operators in Group fou r (Table 4.5) . 
As with previous models, a typical farm operator would have the greatest p rob-
ability to shift in to Group four. The probability of a farm operator to be internall y 
constrained is higher than a farm operator to be externally constrained . The prob-
ability o f fa rm operator t,o be> credit const rain<'d is a pproximately e igh t percent, as 
same as t.he result given in model one. Thus the comprehensive model one does not 
necessarily improve the prC'dictions for credit rationing (Table 4.6) . 
T he s igns of the partial probabilities arc consistent with those of the likelihood 
est imates given in Table ·I. .) .. \ s <'Xpeclcd the probability of bei ng external credit 
constrained is inverse ly rc latC'd to age. transfer in five and ten years, wi llingness to 
main tain credit reserYe. ;'\ rl. CTE. net worth and liquidity. Probabi lity of external 
cred it ration ing (Group onC') increases with high interest rates and debt to assets. 
Probability of interna l credit rationing (Croup Lwo) decreases wiLh age, education , 
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Table 4.5: ~ [aximum likelihood est ima tes for t.he com prehensive model onea 
Yariablesb Chi-Square value log ;; p') logp; p logp; 
Inte rcept. 20.69*** 3.222* -1.4268 3.6121 ***C 
( I. 107) (1.1136) (0.9153) 
Age 56.74 *** -0 .0663-l<** -0.0062 -0.0902 
(0.023 ) (0.014 ) (0.0123) 
Transfer in 5years 7.0.5* -o.:3 '.37 0.0550 -0.4 36*** 
(0.31:35) (0.27 3) (0.1954) 
Transfe r in lOyears 7. 71 *'* -0 . .54 7 *"' 0.2937* 0.0755 
(0.2·158) (0.21 l ) (0.1577) 
Farm Size 3.62 0.000227 0.000019 0.000577* 
(0.00618) (0.000498) (0.000308) 
Education l.84 -0.14 3 0.0245 -1.265 
(0.2115) (0.1332) (0.106 ) 
Net. f a rm Income 3.77 -1. lE-6 -3.24E-6 2.295E-6* 
( ·l.39.5E-6) (2.95 E-6) ( l. 71 6E-6) 
Liquidi ty Ratio .... "7** -4..127* -:3.69 ** -1.6426* 
(2.917) ( 1.602) ( 1.0764) 
Debt/ Assets ".92** 0.66 7 0.6509* 1.1299*** 
(0.7'l..J.3 ) (0.4941) (0.3 48) 
a] 991 lowa f arm r:'inancc S11rve\'. 
0Pseudo n2 :0.90:1ikclihood-rnLio-l<'. t s tatis ti cs (.\"2 ) :11 2 ; degrees of freedom:36. 
Cx=significant at 10 perccnL. "'"'=significa nt. at. 5 percen t. ,"'xx= significant at. l 
percent. 
'O 
Table 4 .. 5 (Continued) 
Mean Net worth 9.46** -9.26E- 7 - l.74E-6* 9.51 7E-7** 
( l.314E-6) (9 .383E-7) ( 4.56E-7) 
GTE 4.41 -1.2615* 0.0118 -0.4189* 
(0. 7559) (0 .0440) (0.3050) 
Credit Reserve 3-1.61 *** -0.3896* -0.0183 -0.6425*** 
(0.2147) (0.1498) (0.1122) 
High Interest Hate ' .03** 0.1273 -0.3355*** -0.1714* 
(0.2173) (0.1408) (0.1111) 
NF[ , mean net worth and liquidity ratio. 
Comprehensive Model Two 
Comprehensive model two intends to confirm the results of model two1 by es-
timating a ll the variables found in models one and two. \Vith the com prehensive 
model Lwo rnriables including transfer in ten years, high interest rates, >IFI GTE 
are nonsignificant. I3ut st ill Lh<' interpretations for high interest rates and GTE hold 
for this model. The resu lts of · FT is inconsistent with respect Lo external credit 
rationing. The signs of the parameter est imates of age, transfer in five years, farm 
s ize, willingness to maintain cred it rcsen·e, high inte rest rates, liquidity ratio. debt to 
asset ratio and GTE are the same as the previous models, th us same interpretations 
hold (or thi s model (Table ,1. 7) . 
As wi th the previous models . the typical farm operator would have the greatest 
probability to shift in to Croup four. The probnbility of farm operators to be credit 
constrained is approxima1.cly twelve percent, ~rn.me as the model two (Table 4 .8). 
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Table 4.6: Probab ilities and part ial derivatives calculated at the sample 
means for the comprehensive model onea 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Probabilities 0.027 0.052 0.019 0.902 
Age -0.00168 -0.00123 -0.00164 0.00345 
Transfer in 5years -0.0099 0.00372 -0.008873 -0.01497 
Transfer in lOyears -0.0148 0.01517 0.0014 -0.00173 
Farm Size 5.641 E-6 .5.2E-8 l .0023E-5 -l.63E-5 
Credi t Reserve -0.0008 0.00028 -0.01175 0.02135 
High In terest Rates 0.0039 -0.0165 -0.00293 0.0156 
Education -0.0033 -0.00199 -0.023 0.2413 
NFI -<I AE-8 -l .59E- 7 4.7E-8 l.57E-7 
GTE -0.0329 0.00276 -0.0071 0.0373 
~fean Net worth -2.2E-8 - ' .5E- 2.E- .SE-8 
Debt/ Assets 0.016 0.03 0.02 -0.066 
Liquidity ratio -OA.5:33 -0. 17-1.J -0.024 7 0.309 
asourcc: l991Farrn Pi110nce Survey. 
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Table 4.7: Maximum likelihood estimates for the comprehensive model twoa 
Variablesb Chi-Square value log ~ p? logp; log ~ 
Intercept 19.57*** 3.6246*** 0.6214 4.0647***C 
(1.3789) (0.9762) {0.9989 
Age 68.81 *** -0.0946*** -0.0526*** -0.0960*** 
{0.0186) (0.0129) (0.0132) 
Transfer in 5years 9.63** -0.6024 ** 0.5582* -0.3288* 
(0.2679) (0.3730) {0.2146) 
Transfer in 10 yea rs 3. "'2 -0.2784 -0.02543* -0.0765 
(0.21-12) {0.1556) (0 .1627) 
Farm Size ' S** 0.000388 0.000851 ** 0.000921 *** 
(0.000488) (0.000377) (0.000344) 
Education 6.57H 0.0752 0.01949* -0.1532 
(0.1546) (0.1115) (0.1156) 
Net farm Income ·L38 :2.9092£-6 -3.0SE-6 5.397E-8 
(2.204 E-6) (2.273E-6) (2.038E-6) 
Liquidity Ratio 6.52* -3 .0216* -2.2922* -1.7161* 
(1.96 5) ( 1.2194) ( 1.1533) 
Debt/ Assets 7. 72** 1.:23:12*** 0.5170 0.9367** 
(0.5L53) (0.44-19) (0.4311 ) 
al991 Iowa farm finance Su rvcv. 
b ·) ~ ) 
Pseudo R-: 0.87: likeliliood-raLio test statistic (X:_ ): 1267; degrees of 
freedom:36. 
c*=significant al 10 p<'rcenl,"""=significanL al 5 percent,*"'*=significant at 1 
percent. 
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Table 4.7 (Continued) 
Mean Net worth 6.81 * 2.668E-8 -l.31E-6* 7.222E-7* 
(7.22E-7) (7 .187E-7) ( 4.833E-7) 
GTE 4.63 -.651 0.0362 -0.5088* 
(0.535 ) (0.0306) (0 .3540) 
Credi t Reserve 34:.63*** -0.5093*** -0.09111 0.6620*** 
(0.16.52) (0.1267) (0.1205) 
High Interes t Rate 1A2 0.04.58 -0.0290 -0.1254 
(0.164 ) (0.1217) (0.1189) 
T he probability of external credit rationing (Group one) is inversely related to age , 
transfer in five years. transfer in ten years, credit reserve, GTE and t he liquidi ty 
ratio, and it is directly related Lo the farm size, credit reserve, high interest rates , 
education , NFI , mean ne t worth and de bt to asset ratio. The probability of internal 
credit rationing, st ill dec li nes with high FI , net worth and liquidity ratio. 
Summary 
In thi s s tudy, the multinomial logit technique wn.s used to predid the probability 
of credit ratio ning occur in t he rural farm sec tor. .-\ ccording to all four models . 
the probC\.bility of internal credit rationing exceeds the probability of external credit 
rationing . 
The results show tha t t he probability of a fa.rm operator being external credit 
rationed is directly re lated to the de bt. LO asset ra t io a nd high interes t ra te and it is 
inversely related to age . plans to t rans fe r. liquidity position , Gross income per dollar 
Table 4.8: Probabi li Lics and partial deri vat ives calcu lated at the sample 
means for the comprehensive model twoa 
Group l Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Probabili t ies 0.052 0.06 0.096 0.784 
Age -0.00·1 -0.0023 -0.0075 0.0138 
T ransfer in 5years -0.03 0.0396 -0.02917 0.0195 
T ransfer in lOyears -0.0124 -0.0 1·16 -0.00358 0.0306 
Farm Size I . 152E-6 .J.6E-.5 7.2£-5 -l.3E-4 
Educat ion 0.00378 0.013 -0.0149 -0.00192 
Net Farm Income 1.5-lE-7 -2.06E-7 l.OE-8 4.2E-8 
Liquidity rat io -0. 1322 -0.12:33 -0.11 0.3745 
Deb t/ Assets 0.05428 0.0222 0.0717 -0. 1483 
J\'fean Nd. worth 2.0E-9 - , .7 E- 7. lSE-S l.4E-S 
GTE -0.0296 0.00791 -0.04114 0.0628 
Credit Reserve -0.0214 3.4GE-4 -0.0543 0.0754 
High Interest Rates 0.002!)''6 -0.0011 -0.0109 0.00911 
asource: 19Ul Farm Finance Sur\'ey. 
I 5 
of expenses, and cred it reserve. The impacts of ed ucation, net farm income and mean 
net worth on probabilit,y of ext.erna l credit rationing are ambiguous. 
The probability for inte rnal credit, rat ioning is negative ly re lated to the age, 
net fa rm income, liquidi ty position and net worth . This probabi lity increases with 
g reater willingness to maintain credit rese rve and with GTE. T he effect of education 
on internal credit rationing is not clear. 
These conclusions a re consistent with the expectat ions, for instance, the repay-
ment abil ity of loans is greaLly i11fluencccl. by 1,he income generating capacity of the 
fa.rm business. Thus farm operators, 
with low NFI are more probable to be cred it, constrained. The results also imply, 
that lower the GTE, the greatc•r the probabi li ty Lo be externally credit constrained, 
ind icating the inverse relationship betwcC'n l he efficiency in use of resources and the 
probability of externa l cred it rationing. The results also confirmed the fa rm operators 
categori zed into Groups one. two a nd three are you nger than those in G roup four, 
thus as anticipated these farm op<'rators havc> a higher debt to assets ratio Lhan that 
of the operators found in Group four. 
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigated the form of credit rationing occurs in the current farm 
sector. To analyze this problem. Lwo class ifications for credit rationing were developed 
based on the information of 1991 Iowa Farm Pina.nee Survey. 
Farm operators who borrowed institu t ional credit but indicated , limited profits 
due to inadequate credit or desire to borrow more at current rates of interest and 
non borrowers who responded that they have limited profits due to inadequate credit 
or a desire to borrow more were classified as externally and in ternally credit con-
st rained farm operators respecti vely. The multinomial Jogi t technique was used as 
an endogenous criterion function , to develop several prediction models, incorporating 
the information of classifications. 
The results from the analysis of this survey data provide important considera-
tions for future agricultural policy. The prediction models revealed. that the prob-
abili ty of a farm operator to be in group one or t.o be externally cred it rationed is 
approximately th ree percent. T he farm operators of this group are characterized by 
young energetic in<liYiduals with high debt Lo asset ratio. smaller gross income per 
dollar of expense, l.iquicliLy ra tio and cred it reserve and t hose who indicated high 
interest rates as one reason for limi ted borrowing. 
Group two farm opera tors. who are internally credit rationed also seem to be 
"7 
with high debt to asset ratio. smal ler Net farm income. mean net worth and liquidity 
ratio. The probability of shifting in to this group is approx imately 5.5 percent, which 
is greater than the probability of external credit rationing. fn contrary to the previous 
literature, these internal credit rationed farm operators are compa rat ively older, and 
with large farming operations. 
Group three farm operators. who performed the best with t he highest return 
on assets, rel.urns on equity, Net farm income with smallest debt to asset ratio, 
can be considered as the most profitable and solvent group of the sample. These 
operators a re making ve ry acceptable cash flow returns on assets and their use of 
debt enhances their return on equity. The probability of shifting in to group three 
would be approximately eigl1t percent. 
Group four represents fa rm operators who neither borrow nor indicated a desire 
for credit. These operators a rc most ly older (a\'erage age is 60 years), earn smaller 
Net fa rm income, returns on assets. reports a very low debt to asset ratio and oper-
ates compa ratively smaller farming units. Probability of shi fting in to this group is 
approximately seventy five percent. 
Conclusion s 
The resu lts of the study high light several important factors which should be 
conside red when evalt1at,ing Lh<' form of credit rationing ex ist in the rural farm sector. 
l. Only a minority. i.e. approximat.cly ~<'n percent of farm op<'raLors are con 
strained in their farming operations by inadequate credit. 
2. The probabili ty of in t.ernal cred it rationing exceeds the probabil ity of externa l 
credit rationing. Thus, the decline in use of credit in rural farm sector, is largely 
a result of decline in demand for cred it by farm o perators. Credit rationing by 
banks does not a ppear to be a significant economic issue. According to the 
results o f the s tud y, approximately seventy five percent of t he sample did not 
even request. financing for expansionary purposes. 
This result may be due to the fact , that this study u ti lized the information 
collected over 1989-1991, during a period, both farm borrowers a nd lenders 
were wa ry aboul handling debt. for several reasons. First, both groups were just 
recovered from the loan losses occurred during the farm financial crisis of 1980s. 
Secondly, th is pe riod resembled the beginning of general economic recession. 
Thirdl y, farm loan rate was peaked in 1989, we ll above t he commercia l lending 
rate. 
Po licy Implications 
This st.udy clearly del ineates. why the growl h of credit in rural areas has slowed 
during late Ur'Os Lo early 1990s. Decomposing the sample of fa rm operators accord-
ing to credit rationing classifications. reveals that approximately fifteen percent of 
t he farm operators are doing well fina ncia lly. Their use of debt enhances the prof-
itability of t he farm busincss<'s. Ov<"rall Lh ree lo five percen t of the population is 
externally credit cons trained. Approximately five Lo seven pe rcent of the sample is 
inte rnally constra ined. SevE>nLy pcrc<'nt of the operators in the sample do not act ively 
participate in t he credit market.. 
The credit raLioniug clas. incations that cat<'gorized farm operators in to di fferent 
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groups, provide valuable consideraLions for policy implications; increase credit avail-
abi lity to externally constrained farm operators, decrease the uncertainties of the 
internally constrained farm operators and provide required incentives for the older 
farm operators to transfer-out and attract potential energetic young operators. 
Public c redit policies a re being advocated on the grounds that rural financial 
markets do not supply the capit.al that. rural farm businesses need . These programs 
may increase the tendency for farm operators to stay employed in agriculture and 
t.o attract potential new, young entrants in to farming, whom were blocked by ex-
pect.ations of bleak financial prospects and steep start-up costs of farming. However 
the models indicated t.hat the probabil ity of external credit rationing is compara-
tively very small in the farm sect.or, thus public credit policy may be only marginally 
helpful. 
P romoting the incen ti ves to use risk management strategies, such as hedging, 
options, forward cont racting and spreading sales or purchases may also help to protect 
farm operators against price uncertai nties. Reduced risks and uncertainties may 
contribute to ease the internal const.ra int.s. Lo some extent. and may lead to increase 
the use of credit. 
The resu lts also have indicated t.hat t.he ma.jor.ity of the farmi ng population left 
with a concentrat ion ol' elderly citizens, \\'ho cont rol over smaller farming units and 
resources , with very li t.t ie credit. Thus policies providing incentives to transfer or 
sellout the operations of ret iring farm operators to a family member or other compe-
tent young farmer oft.en provides a reliable source of financial help and management 
assistance for the beginner. Furthermore this may increase use of add itional credit. 
and resources, utilize capita l mon" procl11ctively and Lhereby to enhance the efficiency 
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of the farm operation. 
Research Implications 
This study points out, that the majority of t he farming population, is comprised 
with farm operators who did not actively participate in credit markets. The results 
emphasized that this group is characterized by older farm operators, with smaller 
farming uni ts. This raises the issue, whether this result is unique to our particular 
sample data or whether farming an occupation characterized by an unusually large 
proportion of older farm operators, who are not keen in borrowing? Thus inclusion 
of large sample, obtained l'rom different major farming areas would be helpful in 
determining, the solution for this question. 
The results also revealed, that about, Len percent of the sample data, seem to be 
liquidity constrained. l\ [ajority of these liquidity constrained operators are internally 
credit rationed. Compari son between the demographic and financial characteris-
tics, yield many va luable informal.ion. Yet, further insight of these internal credit 
ra tioned farm opera.t.ors could be obtained by studying, their previous experiences 
with lenders , apprehensive view about using debt and existing economic conditions. 
Future research could be conducted by examination of individual internally credit 
rationed operators, with respect to these aspects. 
This research employed the logistic regression procedure Lo predict the probabil-
ity of credit ration ing. The logist.ic regression is a standard statist ical method used in 
classifications. The use of an a.ltcrna.tive, non parametric technique, may be useful in 
determining the validity or the obtained results. For instance, CA RT (Classificat ion 
a nd Regression Tree) is an interesting and often powerful alternative to paramet-
91 
ric methods in classification and regression. This met.hod arrives at predictions by 
construct ing binary trees. Future research can be conducted by implementing. such 
more sophis ticated and accurate analytical methods in constructing, prediction rules, 
using the same classifications fo r cred it. rationing in the rural farm sector. 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
1991 Farm Finance Survey 
1. In what county is most of your farming operation located? ------
2. What is your age? .............................................. ................. . ........ . ... .. ..... . . 
3. How many dependents are you s upporting (lncludlng yourseli)? ......... ..... . . 
1003 
4 . How many of these dependents are under age 18? ............... ................. ......... 1
004 
___ ~ 
5. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
Wife 1oos) 0 Wgh school 
Husband (006) 0 hJ.gh school 
0 comm. college 0 college 0 post graduate 
0 comm. college 0 college Dpost graduate 
1
007 
6 . How many years have you been farming? . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . 
7. Owing the 1990 crop year. how many acres did you : 
a. Own ................. . ... .......... . .... ....... ............ ................... ......... ..... .... .... ... . 
b. Rent from others .............. .. .... .............. .............................................. . 
c. Rent to others .... ... .. . ....................... ...... .. ... ..... ............ ... . ... ... .. .. ......... . 
8. Approximately what percent of your 1990 gross farm sales came from 
each of these sources? 
a. Crops .. . ...... . . ..... ............... ............................. ......... ........... ........ .... ..... . 
b. Beef ............................ . ............................ .... . ................. ...... ........ .. .... . 
C. Pork .. ................. .............. ... .............. .. .... ..................... . ..... .. ... ........... . 
d. Dairy .............. ....... ............................................................................. . 
e. Other farm enterpnses .............. ... ............................. ............ .. ... . ....... . 
020 
021 
022 
023 
02• 
9. Since Janu ary 1989. what changes have you made in your farming operauon? (please 
.,, 
°'• 
.... 
"'• 
.,, 
estimate the percentage change m capacity) 
Increase % I Decrease 'lb 
a. Land base ......... . ................ .. ...... ..................................... . 
030 1230 
b. Livestock facilities .............. .. ........................................ ... . 
031 1231 
c. Machinery and equipment capacity ......................... .. ...... . 
032 , . '32 
d. Breeding herd ........... ..................... .. ............... . ................ . 
OJJ I 23J 
100 
10. Which of the following statements best describes your plans for your farm business 
for the indicated time period? 
l!Check all that applYJl l 991 · 1995 1996-2000 
°'° 240 a. Continue present operation as is ... ............ ........... ... ...... .. . 
().61 2• 1 
b. Expand land base .. .......... ................................ ............. '" .. . 
().62 2• 2 
c. Expand breeding herd ....................................... .. ...... ...... . 
043 243 
d. Expand machinery capacity ...................... .... ...... .... ..... .. .. . 
04A 244 
e. Rent land out and retire ......................................... ......... . 
04S 2•5 
f. Transfer farm operation to a family member and retire .... . 
048 248 
g. Sell out and retire ........ .. ..... ....... ..... ..... ............... ........ ..... . 
().67 2•7 
h. Other-------~~-~~-~~~-~~--
11. Since J anuary 1989. have you ever requested financing to expand your farm business? 
Yes ·······--···- ·····----···-··· ----······-----------·-· --·--·----··--···-10501 8 
No (skip to 18) ........ .............. ... ..... ... .... .... .......•........... .. .................... 
12. Was your farm bus.iness expansion request approved? 
Yes ·---·--··----··------- ------····-· -·--·-----<05•1 
No (skip to 16) .............. .. .... .......•......••.••.............. ...... ... ... .........••.•••.. 
13. Were you required to make changes in your request for expansion financing 
in order to receive financing? 
Yes ·····----········ ··········--·-·········--·--···-·--·-·---···-·-·--···-··· -·-····-·-···--··'05%1 
No (skip to 15) ................................ .. ......... ... ..... ... ...... ..... ..... ....... .... . 
8 
8 
14. Estimate the percentage change from your original fmancial request for farm business 
expansion that you were required to make. 
Increase 1%1 Decrease 1%) 
a . The size of the expansion ...... .. ........................................ . . 060 260 
b. Down payinent ... ....... ................................................. ..... . Oll l 
C>1 
c. Term of the loan .. .. .... ....... ...................................... ......... . 062 2a2 
d. Interest rate .. ......... ........................ .... ............... ... . ......... . . Oll3 253 
e. Collateral ............. ........... ........... ........................ ...... ...... . . - 2$4 
101 
15. Estimate what percent of your e.xpansion financing was obtained from the following 
lenders and Indicate how lon g you have done business with each? 
Financing Years 
provided 1%) with lender 
a. Your own funds (equity) Including trade-In value 
of machinery ..................... ....... ..... ....... ...... .... .. .. ............ . . 
070 !'JA 
071 081 
b. Local bank ............... .......... ... ................ ... .... ........ ......... .. . 
072 082 
c . Larger urban bank ............ .. ...... .. .............................. ...... . 
073 083 
d. Farm credit system ....................... .... .. ............... ............. .. 
07• OM 
e. FlnHA ....................... ........ ................................ ...... ...... ... . 
075 085 
f. Insurance company .. ...... .. .... . ... ....................................... . 
07S 08ll 
g. Merchant or dealer ................... .... ............... .................... . 
on 087 
h. Individual .. ... .............. .. ................................. ...... .... ........ . 
071 08I 
I. Other ... .... .............. .............. .............................. ............. . 
I 1 If you answered 15. skip to 1 7 I I 100% 
16. If your loan for the expansion was not approved. check all reasons that apply. 
090 
a . Income from expansion was too variable .. .. ..................................... ......... . 
091 
b. Insufficient documentation (budget or cash fl owl ... .. .. ............................... . 
092 
c. Previous loss experience ............. ....................... ............. .... ............ ... ... .... . 
093 
d. Insufficient cash flow .......... .... ... .. ......................... ...... ... ......... .... ..... .... .... . -e. Insufficient collateral ............... ....... ................. .. .... ............ ... ................... . 
095 
f. Current debt levels were too high . ....... ........ .. ....................... .................... . 
09l5 
g. Not a profitable e.xpansion ......................... ......... ..... ..................... .. ....... ... . 
Ci97 
h. Lack of experience with this enterprise ........ .. ...... . .................. ................ . .. 
098 
I. Loan was wrong purpose for this lender ............. ..... .. .. .. ............... .. .......... . 
09\l 
J. Other (please Indicate) 
17. Did you contact more than one lender about financing your e.xpansion? 
No ... ....... . .... ............ .............. .. .................... ................... ..... .. ... .. . .... . B Yes ---··-············--······· ......... _, ____ ............... --............................................... - ...................... -·· -·········---.. .. 11011 
18. Has Inadequate financing limited the profitability or growth of your farm business? 
Yes .................................. _ .................................................. -................. -.... - .................................................................. 11021 
No (skip to 20) ............................ ..................... .......... .. .... .. .............. . B 
102 
19. Please rate the ex.tent to which the following factors were effected by limited borrowing. 
I 1 Please circle I( Olilli Sc:vcre.ly 
affected 
a . Moderruzation facilities and eqwpment ............ . 
b. Full utilization of facilities or machinery to 
270 l 2 
l71 
fullest extent ..... ........... ....... ... ......... ............. .. . 
c. Ability to fully employ existing labor force ........ . 
l 2 
272 
I 2 
273 
d. Ability to generate adequate family Income .. ... . l 2 
l7• 
e. Ability to take advantage of future economic 
opportunities ... ........... .......... ..... ..... ...... ......... . 1 2 
275 
f. Ability to employ and support additional 
operator or family ........................... ........ ................ . 
g. Other {please Indicate) ---------
l 2 
2711 
l 2 
20 . Would you be willing to take on additional debt lf your lender offered 
to make credit available? 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Not 
affected 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
·i 5 
Yes --·-····-·-·-··-·-----······----·-··----··········-··--·--··-··-··-··-···· · --·······--···-·······---t119) B No ........... ... .......... ... .... .................. ... .. .. ..... .. ... ........ ... .. ........ ....... ..... . 
21. Why have you limited your borrowing? 
120 !lcheck all that apply lj 
a. Interest rates are too high ..... ..... ....... .. .... ..... ... ..... ............ .. ................ . 
121 
b. I want to maintain cash reserves .... ..... ............. .. ......... ...... ... .. .... .. ...... . 
c. I want to maintain a credit reserve ...... ..... ...... ..... ........... .... ........ ... ..... . 
1Zl 
d. Profit margins were Insufficient ... ................... ... ..... ... .. ...... ...... ..... ...... . 
12• 
e. My lender is unwilling to offer addltional credit .... ... . ...... ... ... .. .. ...... .... . 
22. Which risk management strategies do you use? 
I !Please circle II Ea:gucoo: 12i l.!:ic 
Never Sometimes Alwavs 
280 
a. Multiple peril crop Insurance ......................... ........ . 
281 
I 2 3 4 5 
b. Hail Insurance .. .. ............................... ........................ . I 2 3 4 5 
c. Hedging ....................................................................... . 
Z82 
1 2 3 4 5 
283 
d. Forward contracting ................................................. . I 2 3 4 5 
e. Commodity options .. ....................................... ......... . 
28' 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Crop s hare leases .................................................. ... . 
g. Participate In government programs ..... ........... . 
285 
1 2 3 4 5 
21!8 
I 2 3 4 5 
23. From your 1990 tax records (form 1040. 1040F. 1040E. and form 4797) or your farm 
account book. please list the following in formation: 
1990 
dollar values 1040 Form 
1<0 
a. Total income. (line 27) ......................... ..... ... ......... .......... ................ . 
1• 1 
b. Wages and salaries. (line7l .......... ....... ....... .. .......... .. .... .. ... .... .......... . 
1•2 
c. Interest and dividends. (line Sa + Sb + 91 ...................... .... .... .......... . 
1"3 
d. Capital gains or losses (lines 13 + 14 + 15) ... ................. .. ........ .. ... .. . 
1040F Form 
1 .. 
d. Gross income. (line 11 l .. . ................. ..... ................. ......... ............ ..... . 
••5 
e. Interest expense. (lines 23a + 23b) ......................... .... ................ .... . 
1'8 
f. Depreciation (line 16) ........ ................. ............. ..... ...... .. ...... .. .. ... ..... . 
' •7 
g. Total expenses. (line 35) ......................... .. .... ....... ... ........ ............. ... . 
1040E Form 
148 
h. Net farm rental income received .... ........... ..... ................ .. ....... ........ . 
4797 Form 
!. Sale of breeding stock (line l Sl .......................... ..... . ... .. ... ............... . 
1•9 
24 . What was the approximate market value of farm and financial assets vou have owned 
the past two years? (please use fmanc1al statements lf available) · 
J an. 1990 J an. 1991 
a. Cash in checking. savings accounts . ........... ...... ... ............ . 
150 160 
b. Financial investments (CDs. mutual funds) ... .......... .. ...... . 
151 141 
c. Crops and livestock for sale 
(including CCC crops under loan) ........ ........................... . . 
152 142 
d. Machinery. eqwpment. breedlng s tock ...... .... .... ... .. .... ...... . 
153 ' 63 
e. Land and buildings .......... . ..... ....................... . ....... .... .. ... . . 
15' 16" 
f. Total assets ............ ... .... ......................................... ..... ... . . 
ISS 1115 
104 
25. Please list your outstanding loan balances for farm real estate and farm non-reaj estate 
debt by type of lender on January 1. 1990 and 1991. 
Non -real Estate Debt Real Estate Debt 
Jan. 1990 Jan. 1991 Jan. 1990 Jan. 1991 
a. Bank ....................... . 
170 180 190 200 
b. Farm credit system .. 
c. FmHA 
171 181 19~ 201 
1n 182 192 202 
d. Insurance company .. 
e. Individual ..... .. ........ . 
173 183 193 203 
174 18' 194 204 
f. Merchant or dealer .. . 
175 IBS 195 205 
g. Other loans (incl. ccc) 
176 188 196 20ll 
1n 187 197 "Z07 
h . Total debt.. .............. . 
11 Note: If you have a question that requires an answer from the ISU Economics I 
11 Department please complete the following: 
I authortze Iowa Agricultural Statistics to forward my name and address to Dr. Robert Jolly. 
ISU. Economics Department. for response to my questions. 
Iowa Date _ ___ _ 
Zip 
105 
APPENDIX B. FINANCIAL RATIOS 
Profitabilty Ratios 
Return on assets (ROA ) 
Interpre tation: The ratio est imates pre-tax earnings per dollar of investment. It can 
be used as an index of profiLabili ty Lhat is independent of the in which the firm is 
financed . Changes in asset va.lues can ce1 use the raLlo to fluctuate. Fam ily li ving 
expenses are used as proxy fo r Lhe val ue of unpaid la bor and management. Note that 
t he ROA measures only lhe income return on assts, capital gains a re not included . 
Return on equity (ROE ) 
C · RO net {arm income - amil livinc ex enses om putat10n: E=--------~-__,....-----~~-­net wort 
Interpretation: ROE is a profitabil ity index that reflects the pre-tax earnings on assets 
as well as the financial structu re of the bus iness. It measures t he return per dollar of 
owner equity. T he ROE will be influenced by changes in asset values, indebtedness 
a nd interest rates . 
106 
Cost of debt (COD) 
0 interest p_aid Computation: C D= total liabilities 
Interpretation: The COD is the weighted interest rate on debt. The weights are 
based on the total outstanding loan balances for each observation. 
Solvency Ratios 
Debt to assets ratio(DAR) 
Computation : DAR= total liabilities 
total a8sets 
Interpretation: Th is ratio measures the indebtedness of t he farm in percentage terms. 
Net capital ratio (NCR) 
Computation: NCR= total as?~l~ 
total liabih ties 
Interpretation: The long-run solvency position of a business is indicated by the net 
capital ratio. It reflects the likelihood that sale of all assets would produce sufficient 
cash to cover a.II debt outstand ing. 
Leverage ratio (LR) 
Computation: LR= t olcil liabilities 
owner equity 
Interpretation: It specifies the dollars of debt fo r every dollar of equity, t he higher 
the ratio the greater the fin ancial leverage and lower t he solvency. 
107 
Interest coverage ratio (ICR) 
Compu tat ion: IC R= net fnnn rn.:ome + mtenst p111J - fanuly lil'ing e:rpenses 
interest paid 
Interpretation: T his ratio measures t he relationship bet.ween capital earn ings and 
interest pa.id on debt . The higher t he ratio. lhe lesser the burden of interest on 
111com e. 
Efficiency Ratios 
Gross r atio (GR) 
Collll)llta.t ion:GR= total npenses 
gross income 
luterpreta.tion: The lower this value, the more efficient the farm business. 
Turn over ratio (TO) 
C'omtHita tion: T O= tota l gross income 
ualae of f 11.1·m n ss.,t.s 
In terp retat ion: T hi s r a t io measures the sales volume generntf'd pf'r dolla r of assets. 
T he TO ratio is an index of t he effic iency with which the capi ta l stock is ut ilized. 
Current ratio (CR ) 
Computation: C'R= total current _ as~:t~ 
total current /1 abi/1tie.s 
l utPrpretaJio n: The current rat io indicates t he extent to which curren t assets. if 
liquidated wou ld CO\"f'I' cu rrent. liabi li ties outstanding. 
Fixed ratio (FR) 
( 'om ()Utalion: FR= long term a33et., 
real e&tate liab1/1t1e3 
108 
I11te rpret<1t io11: This ratio measures t.he relationship betwef'n long term assets and 
liabilities. l l is an index of the degree to which long-term equi ty reserves might bf' 
available for refinancing. 
